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1 Problem statement 
 
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro, and believe me, it is enough”  
(Draghi, July 26th, 2012) 
 
The words swept through Europe on the 26th of July 2012. The originator of the words was Mario 
Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), who was preparing an extensive bond 
buying scheme, which could reduce borrowing costs in crisis-stricken countries like Italy and Spain.   
Both the words of Draghi and the bond buying scheme were controversial, as they meant that the 
ECB promised to be the saviour of the euro, while stretching its mandate so far that some argued 
it was illegal. Especially Jens Weidmann, head of the powerful German Bundesbank, opposed 
Draghi’s plans. Nevertheless, Draghi gained support from all the other central banks in the 
Eurozone and succeeded in forcing through this new weapon for defending the euro (reuters.com 
Sep. 26th 2012). By this, he demonstrated how powerful the ECB had become.  
Four years earlier, before the financial crisis hit Europe, such a measure by the ECB - who is only 
supposed to be involved in monetary politics - would have been unheard of. However, the crisis 
seems to have pivoted the role and power of the financial and technocratic institution called the 
ECB.   
 
1.1 The crises: From financial to banking to sovereign debt 
What is today known as ‘the financial crisis’ was popularly said to initiate with the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, while several different tendencies can be seen as having had 
an impact and caused the current crisis situation. Banks in especially the US and Europe were 
faced with their lacking liquidity and the means to borrow credit to cover it, and thus started to 
pull back their loans from abroad (Helleiner 2011). This made the US central bank and several 
central banks around the Eurozone bail-out or nationalise commercial banks, to avoid them going 
bankrupt, which then indebted the national banks (Overbeek 2012). When banks were out of 
credit they could not lend to each other, to investors and to private people. This freeze of the 
financial system, mixed with a spread of a general mistrust in banks, meant that borrowing and 
lending halted, while trade came to a standstill in several sectors, which hampered the states’ 
balance of payments (Helleiner 2011). What a mess.   
 
The sovereign debt crisis was and is particularly striking in the European region. Especially for the 
countries in the single currency area, where the economic and political cooperation is particularly 
close, and where some countries have built up high debt levels.1  
 
                                                 
1
 The Eurozone currently consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  
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17 of the 27 EU countries are members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and share the 
Euro as their currency. This constellation makes the financial relations between the member states 
extraordinarily close and the countries vulnerable to each other’s financial situation. A joint 
solution towards the sovereign debt crises has been required, putting coherence of the EMU and 
its member states’ policies, ambitions, ideologies and willingness for future integration to the test. 
 
1.2 Crisis solving mechanisms 
Several initiatives have been made by different EU and EMU actors, towards solving the sovereign 
debt problems within the Eurozone. The initiatives are made on different functional levels and 
adhere to diverse policy levels. Some constitute actual constellations of actor cooperation, others 
are specific crisis funds, and again others institute rules and legislation. Supervision and new 
technical tools have been developed. The functions and targets of the initiatives differ as well, 
where some are meant for the immediate situation, and others are reforms of the EMU system on 
the longer run. The functions represent different types of loan provisions, technical assistance etc. 
as well as strengthening the adherence to rules setup in the original EMU system, and punish 
violations hereof with sanctions. Several initiatives taken during the crisis can be seen to have an 
impact on the general structures of the EMU, either directly through the new tool or legislation, or 
through the conditions attached to it (Cœuré Mar. 26th 2012).   
  
1.3 The European Central Bank (ECB) 
Recurring in several of these crisis solving strategies is a particular actor; the ECB. Established as 
part of the EMU to conduct the monetary policy, the first and foremost objective of the ECB is to 
maintain price stability by keeping inflation low. The ECB was constructed as a technocratic 
institution, independent and insulated from political pressure, and governed by people appointed 
on a basis of their merits in the financial sector. The institution’s business was to stay within the 
monetary sector (ECB 2011: 14ff).  
 
 With the crisis and the crisis solving measures, the ECB seems to have been provided with a 
somewhat different role in the EMU than was originally intended. It has taken several non-
standard measures. The OMT is the latest and the most controversial. ECB has also become 
member of the so-called Troika, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Commission, which designs the adjustment programs for debt stricken countries 
applying for loans through the ESM or EFSF. On fiscal policies, the exact role of the ECB is 
somewhat unclear, but the new initiatives seem to move in the direction they want. Lastly, 
Draghi’s claim in the introduction, about being able to preserve the euro within the mandate of 
the ECB, poses a question of what is actually within this mandate. Regardless of whether the 
mandate has been transcended, widened or merely taken to the limit in all these initiatives, they 
provide the ECB with new options and new relations.    
Global Political Economy 
 Dec. 18th 2012 
European Control Bank? 
 
5 
 
This seemingly transfer of power to the ECB - be it directly, through lobbying, the Troika or 
discourse - as a way of solving a crisis has triggered the interest leading to this research. It 
represents a development that can be said to be democratically challenging, if more power is 
given to institutions like the ECB, which is insulated from public scrutiny. At the same time, the 
crisis is so current and severe that decisions need to be made quickly, and the technocratic 
institutions of the ECB must be considered knowledgeable to do this, compared to an often long-
term process of democratic discussions. The means and strategies towards solving the crisis are 
interesting in this relation as well, as the ECB represents a strict monetary discipline, which can be 
spreading to the rest of the Eurozone. Lastly, that all of this is happening in a time of severe 
financial distress is interesting and can be said to be problematic among other things because 
some member states are paying loans to other member states, constituting an internal inequality 
of the Eurozone bigger than before. With basis in the above mentioned initiatives taken during the 
crisis, this project therefore concerns itself with the changing role of ECB.  
 
1.4 Research question 
 
Why has the role of the ECB changed during the crisis? 
 
This research question calls for some conceptual specifications. When referring to the ‘ECB’s role’, 
the focus lies on its power as the independent central bank of the Eurozone member states, to act 
towards solving the crisis, either through direct actions made by the ECB or through its function as 
technically knowledgeable. ‘The ECB’ is conceptualized here as the decision making body; the ECB 
Governing Council, consisting of the six members of the Executive Board and the Presidents from 
the 17 Eurozone countries’ national banks. Lastly, ‘the crisis’ refers to the current banking and 
sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone stemming from around 2010.  
 
1.5 Working questions 
In order to answer the problem statement, it becomes essential to fragment it into a few research 
questions, which will be used as guidelines throughout the report. 
 
First of all, the research question indicates that the role of the ECB has changed, which calls for a 
specification of what has actually changed as well as reference to this assumption. Researching 
this change thus calls for a comparison to what the ECB has changed from, and what has become 
its role in solving the current crisis. Being the central bank of the Eurozone, this outline needs to 
also include the structure and history of the EMU, the idea behind the EMU from its beginning, 
and its development through a time of seemingly continued prosperity to a time of crisis. Thereby, 
the first research question asks  
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- What was the role of the ECB in the EMU before the crisis – its intended role?  
 
Secondly, the new initiatives taken in an effort to solve the crisis represent some of the changes 
affecting the role of the ECB in this research, as they include and/or impact the ECB in one way or 
the other. This implies that the ECB has either gained power, or that the ECB as an institution has 
increased its utility more than before the crisis. To understand its changing role, an analysis of the 
three types of initiatives, namely the EFSF/ESM, the Six-pack and the Fiscal Compact, as well as the 
OMT, and what they mean to the ECB is required, calling for a working question that asks 
 
- What impact have the crisis solving mechanisms had on the role of the ECB?  
 
Lastly, to answer the problem statement, it is important to identify and analyse what ideas, 
human actions and powers were behind these exact initiatives to be suggested, supported and 
agreed upon. This will provide an insight towards the crisis solving discourse and institutions in 
power, and links to the structure of the EMU that has been analysed in answering the first working 
question.  
 
- What forces have made these changes come about? 
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2. Theory 
This theoretical outline takes off on an abstract and philosophical level, while continuously 
developing into getting more and more concrete towards the focus of this report.    
Initially, the concepts of Critical Theory are introduced as the ontology and philosophical approach 
of the research. Following this, Gramscian concepts are presented as the main theoretical 
approach to the research. This provides definitions stemming from Gramsci himself, as well as 
interpretations and further elaborations made by Neo-Gramscian European integration scientists, 
who apply Gramsci’s concepts to a specific context of the EU. Among these scientists, 
Distinguished Research Professor at York University, Stephen Gill is chosen in particular due to his 
focus on how and why governments within the Eurozone have moved the regulation authority of 
capital markets from democratically accountable entities to technocratic institutions like central 
banks. He is supplemented by other Neo-Gramscians. The section ends with an outline of the 
juxtaposition towards alternative European integration theories, thereby presenting and justifying 
the choice of theory.   
 
2.1 Meta-theoretical framework 
Critical Theory is understood and interpreted in multiple ways. In this research, Robert Cox’s 
interpretation and concepts constitute the ontological framework.  
 
2.1.1. Critical theory 
Critical Theory has as its main purpose to analyse the underlying structures of society in which 
action takes place. Also, Critical Theory is based upon the need to understand that these 
structures are changeable by historic processes and human action. Because this research lies 
within the field of international relations, it is useful to draw upon the work of Cox, who applies 
Critical Theory upon institutions, state action and world order.  
Cox understands and presents thoughts and aspects of Critical Theory against what he calls 
problem-solving theory.   
  
2.1.2 Problem-Solving and Critical Theory 
According to Cox, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose”, and derives from a 
perspective based on a context of social and political time and space, exemplified by among other 
things a present crisis and/or expectations for the future. Because observers view the world from 
a certain perspective, there is no such thing as theory in itself independent of time and space 
context (Cox 1981). In relation to our research, the context of a global financial crisis, and more 
specifically a banking and sovereign debt crisis within the regional space of the Eurozone, will be 
considered essential to the decisions made, and how they are possible to make.     
 
Within a context, Cox distinguishes between the purpose of theory to be either guiding to solve a 
problem within the existing structure, thereby fixing or improving it, or to question the premises 
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and conditions of a problem’s context, and possibly form an alternative (Cox 2010). The ‘problem-
solving theory’ “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and 
the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework of action” (Cox 1981). 
 
This purpose seeks to solve the problem it identifies, and does not question the present order. The 
theory is non-historical, because it does not consider history to be a process of structural 
importance, but seeks to solve a problem from the premise that the present institutional order is 
somewhat permanent (Cox 1981). On this basis, problem-solving theory can arrive at essential and 
objective conclusions, because it does not recognise the complexity of a changing reality (Cox 
1981). Put in a less condescending way, it is “practical and necessary since it tells us how to 
proceed given certain conditions” (Cox 2010).  
However, this approach is criticised as being based on a false premise by the Critical Theory 
purpose, which 
 
“(…) stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that 
order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take 
institutions and social power relations for granted, but calls them into 
question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they 
might be in a process of changing”           (Cox 1981) 
 
This approach critiques – though not in an overall denouncing way – the problem-solving view of 
social and political order as something that is fixed, and believes it instead to be changing (Cox 
1981). A difference between the approaches is thus that the problem-solving is somewhat static 
and the Critical Theory is not. Critical Theory questions institutions, relations and actors and 
concerns itself with the origins of these. Thereby this theory is questioning the whole context of 
action, and thus opens up to the possibility of alternative world orders (Cox, 1981). 
As we are researching the changed order in the EMU we find this approach to be useful to our 
research. In a Coxian manner, we call the ECB into question and go into debt with its origin and 
whether it might be in a process of changing.  
 
However, this ‘seeking to understand the whole framework in which the initial problem was just 
one part’ also makes Critical Theory imprecise in a way that it always has to change its concepts 
and adjust them to the new and changed order. Thereby, the theory is criticised for being useless 
in providing general solutions and recommendations, especially because an indefinite number of 
unspecified alternatives are viewed as possible, making the approach somewhat abstract (Cox 
1981).    
While the generalising rules and solutions are the strength of the problem-solving theory, the 
Critical Theory claims to be useful through its limitation towards alternatives that are actually 
feasible transformations of the prevailing order (Cox 1981). Also, Critical Theory strikes back at the 
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critique by stating that because the problem-solving theory creates generalising rules based on a 
prevailing order that they do not question, it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework (Cox 1981). This can be said to have an effect of actually strengthening and legitimising 
whatever present order there is. 
As it is not the aim of this research to create or confirm generalising rules, but instead to focus on 
a structural order, we likewise find it important to adjust the concepts used. Therefore the use of 
Critical Theory seems relevant, and the concepts used will be adjusted to the specific context. 
 
 2.1.3. Framework for action 
The concept of ‘framework for action’ is one of the main features of the Critical Theory and needs 
to be elaborated on. It stems from the Marxist current of understanding world order through 
‘historical materialism’, which is based on a historical reasoning and which seeks to explain and 
promote social change (Cox 1981). The Neo-Gramscians Bastian van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek 
and Magnus Ryner further specifies this meta-theoretical approach as being transnational in a 
relation of European integration theory, where processes take place simultaneously in 
subnational, national and international arenas, and where national boundaries are still existing 
and can be important, but don’t fundamentally characterise dynamics (Apeldoorn et.al, 2003 p. 
39). From this, analysis should be holistic and include several spheres, because isolation of 
concepts is impossible. This approach again constitutes the importance of history, context and 
humanity as fundamentally determined by the historic context of social relations between humans 
(Apeldoorn et.al., 2003 p. 33-34). The transnational historical materialist approach adds to Cox’s 
framework for action and force of ideas (presented below), both considered shaped by human 
action:  
 
“It is only in human activity that ideas are generated, and here the structural 
conditions in which this activity takes place must also enter into the analysis”  
(Apeldoorn et.al, 2003 p. 30).  
 
Research should thus include an on-going reconsideration of world order aspects, meaning that 
the context should be considered changeable and taken into account in its past, present and 
future order, because social relations can change and affect interests and identities of agents 
(Apeldoorn et.al., 2003 p. 29).  
Based upon this, Cox outlines the characteristics of a framework for action as constituting a 
historical structure combined by thought patterns, material conditions and human institutions. He 
states that human action is never absolutely free, but takes place within a framework for action, 
which cannot be ignored, but can be resisted and opposed by the actors, who are also the ones to 
change the framework over time (Cox 1981).   
Thus, according to Cox, theory and problems are changeable depending on the framework, and 
the goal for Critical Theory is to understand these changes, and be open to the possibility that 
action within a framework can lead to its transformation.  
Global Political Economy 
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On this basis, this research will be initiated by a historical outlining of the problem area, providing 
us with knowledge about structure and context of the problem we are investigating.   
The feature of framework for action leads back to the distinction between the purpose of theory, 
where Cox claims periods of stable power relations to be favouring the somewhat static problem-
solving approach, while periods of uncertainty among power relations favour Critical Theory, 
when people are trying to comprehend possible alternatives to the prevailing order and risks 
involved in a change (Cox 1981). The changing frameworks and historical contexts thereby have 
different impacts to the two theoretical approaches. As the current financial crisis has been a 
shock to the EMU, it can possibly displace the power relations of member states and EU 
institutions, including the ECB, thus making it interesting to approach the research from a Critical 
Theory-angle.  
 
2.1.3 Forces of social change 
The notion of ‘forces of social change’ is used as a framework to understand the processes of 
societal change within a context. Cox presents three distinct and rather broad concepts, each 
representing a type of force used to conserve or resist a prevailing historical structure, and which 
might form an alternative structure in the future. According to Cox, the forces influence each 
other reciprocally depending on the specific context (Cox, 1981).   
 
2.1.3.1 Force of ideas 
The force of ideas is described as consisting of two kinds; one is Intersubjective Meanings, 
understood as a common ground of social discourse, where understandings of social relations and 
behaviour are shared. These meanings are conditioned by history, meaning that they are 
changeable depending on the context, and that their origin is possible to trace, as is the possible 
signs of their weakening (Cox 1981).  
The other kind of idea is Collective Images, where views on the nature and legitimacy of the 
prevailing order are different among people or groups within a society. These several, different 
and opposing views can clash, whereby it becomes evident that alternatives to the prevailing 
order can exist (Cox 1981).  
 
2.1.3.2 Force of institutions 
This force constitutes the means to stabilise and maintain a particular order. According to Cox, 
they reflect the power relation from their point of origin and tend to encourage collective images 
consistent with this, at least initially. Eventually they take on their own life (Cox 1981). The 
institutions have an enforcement potential, where the stronger can clobber the weaker, and thus 
remain in power through coercive means. However, if the stronger is willing to make concessions 
to the weaker for them to support the leadership of the strong, a hegemon can be created or 
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stabilised. The institutions may then become anchor of this hegemonic strategy, but do not 
themselves constitute a hegemon (Cox 1981). 
 
2.1.3.3 Force of material capabilities 
Material capabilities are described as “productive and destructive potentials”. This is to be 
understood as either natural resources or technological and organisational capabilities and the 
wealth to finance it all (Cox 1981).  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework: Neo-Gramscian concepts in European integration 
The theoretical approach of Neo-Gramscianism is developed from the Italian Marxist and leader of 
the Italian Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) work from the 1930s. In the 
following, different concepts stemming from Gramsci are presented, dually in a strict Gramscian 
choice of words, and in an adjusted framework of a European integration context.  
 
2.2.1 Historical blocs 
Gramsci developed a concept of a historic bloc, which he considered formed by structures and 
superstructures. From this, Gramsci saw material conditions (structures) and ideas 
(superstructures) as bound together in a reciprocal relationship (Cox 1983).   
Definitions of current historical blocs are different depending on the social scientist behind the 
definition. To Gill, historical blocs are considered to be the wider social and political arena within 
which several hegemonic ideas can be exercised. A historical bloc is said to constitute a fusion of 
material forces, institutions and ideas/ideologies, which falls in line with Cox’s understandings of 
forces of structure (Gill & Law 1993 p. 94).  
Based on Gramsci’s historical bloc concept, Gill developed a more specific characteristic of the 
international historic bloc, based on a ‘Western’ and an anti-communist alliance, emerging 
especially from increased US force in the post-World War II era, bringing mass-consumption and 
the capitalist state into the centre. This bloc also contributed to internationalisation of financial 
interests (Gill & Law 1993, p. 96-97).    
After a period of more integration due to political economy globalisation, Gill saw this bloc as 
developing into the current transnational historic bloc, where organised labour has become 
marginalised, and where “finance has taken the place of production as the main determinant of 
capitalist accumulation strategies” (Gill 2003: 62). The developments in this era, which re-
launched European integration, were in particular the realisation of the single market in 1992. 
What makes this bloc transnational is its “political synthesis of interests and identities drawn from 
across social classes and nations that mediates and seeks to coordinate national, regional and 
global dimensions of accumulation and legitimation” (Gill 1998). According to Gill, this historic bloc 
generates social and material forces that associate with the movement towards a neoliberal state.  
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The current historical bloc is said by Gill to be founded in capitalist society beliefs. Constituting 
structure and superstructure makes it permeate both ideas and practices of capitalism, in an arena 
where a hegemon of neoliberalism can be said to have good conditions to spread. In this 
theoretical framework, the concept of historical bloc is thereby understood as being transnational. 
The more specific type of capitalism must be found on a somewhat lower level, and is thus 
constituted by the current hegemony.  
 
2.2.2. Hegemony  
The Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian understanding and use of the concept of ‘hegemony’ differs 
from the one of Realists. The latter consider a hegemon to be the power of a state or alliance of 
states over others. Instead, to Gramsci a hegemon was understood as an order, where  
 
“(…) consent rather than coercion, primarily characterized the relations between 
classes, and between the state and civil society”  
(Gill & Law 1993, p. 93).  
 
This definition reveals Gramsci’s state view as one of an ‘integral’ or ‘extended’ state, constituting 
a fusion between the two levels of state and civil society:  
 
“(…) the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These 
two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which 
the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to 
that of ‘direct domination’ or command through the state and ‘juridical’ 
government”  
 (Gramsci, 1971, as cited in Bieler and Morton, 2001: 19) 
 
From this quote, the civil society is considered the sphere where “the dominant group” exercises 
and ensures its hegemonic power – that is not through coercion. This view stems from the context 
in which Gramsci developed the concept. Essential to this was that “the dominant group”, in his 
time was the bourgeoisie at the top of the capitalist class society. The bourgeoisie needed support 
from the lower classes to constitute their role as hegemonic leaders to keep the capitalist system 
going and avoid revolt and revolution from the clearly strong and majority of people in the lower 
classes. They succeeded by having civil society institutions create, spread and maintain a mentality 
of support towards the hegemonic social order, by accepting capitalism in return for social 
democracy. This was opposite to the hegemonic structure in the communist Russia, which had no 
civil society as such and thus relied on a strong and coercive state to stay in power (van Apeldoorn 
et.al. 2003 p. 36-37).  
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Where Gramsci works on a level of state and civil society, the research of this design works on a 
level of the EU, portraying the ECB as an institution in relation to other international institutions, 
nations, crisis mechanism etc.  
 
Consent needs to be constantly ensured. This requires a flexible hegemony, ready to adjust, 
reshape and compromise to keep the masses calm and favouring the hegemony.  
 This is done, according to Gramsci, through ‘organic intellectuals’, who produce ideas that need 
to stem from the economic sphere, and also must develop into political and social spheres, 
thereby restructuring social form and creating hegemonic political systems. The intellectuals also 
organise the social forces from the classes where they stem, and transcend the interest of the 
particular group into a hegemonic project. Through this, the remaining forces of society are 
experiencing an understanding and view that makes them give their consent to the hegemon. In 
this way, the work of the intellectuals “brings the interest of the leading class into harmony with 
the subordinates and incorporates these ideas into an ideology expressed in universal terms”, as 
Cox puts it (Cox 1983).   
Additional to Gramsci’s concept, Cox views a hegemony as based upon his taxonomy presented 
above, that is “on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the 
prevalent collective image of world order (…) and a set of institutions which administer the order 
with a certain semblance of universality” (Cox 1981). The hegemonic ideology thus lies in the 
discursive idea of the dominating class and is exercised by the institutions. Based on these two 
understandings, a current hegemony should be possible to identify within the Eurozone by looking 
at institutions and ideas in power.   
Gill developed concepts that resemble the notion of a current neoliberal hegemony within the 
Eurozone that is the Disciplinary Neoliberalism and the New Constitutionalism.  
 
2.2.3 Disciplinary Neoliberalism  
Gill developed a concept of Disciplinary Neoliberalism to explain the wide European discourse of 
current neoliberalism. The objectives central in the discourse are property rights and investor 
freedom security, as well as market discipline in the state and labour, in order to secure private 
investors’ view on markets to be credible. Thus, the discourse favours a world, where government, 
corporations and workers act in accordance with market and capital forces (Gill 1998). More 
specifically, in a European context Gill advices the EMU to be understood in a framework of 
policies 
“(…) that has shifted the European Union towards a neoliberal and financial, 
as opposed to a social market and social democratic, model of capitalism. This 
viewpoint favors tight monetary and financial discipline in a rules-based 
economic constitution as a means to deliver low inflation and protect savings”  
     (Gill 1998) 
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From this, Gill can be understood as claiming Disciplinary Neoliberalism to be a hegemonic idea 
within the transnational historical bloc of capitalism. The focus on low inflation is found by Gill to 
be the absolute priority in the EMU and EU, whereby a monetarist belief has conquered a more 
Keynesian and employment oriented belief. This development will be further outlined in the 
historical framework in the analysis. The use of ‘disciplinary’ to specify the neoliberal discourse is 
found by Gill to stem from the idea that the world is consisting of governments, firms and workers 
who are “internally and externally disciplined by market forces, or put differently, by the power of 
capital” (Gill 1998).  
On a matter of public and economic policy, Gill argues that European corporate governance is 
being constructed within the Disciplinary Neoliberalism, giving power of capital, and thus capital 
owners, a more effective say on how macro- as well as microeconomic policy is formed. At the 
same time, in the context of Disciplinary Neoliberalism, market forces and the ‘normalisation’ of 
the neoliberal hegemony “discipline actors’ outlook, expectation and systems of incentives” (Gill 
2003: 65). Through this, the neoliberal discourse is permeating all levels of economic society, 
giving the neoliberal hegemony good conditions to ensure a power of consent from the public.  
 
2.2.4 New Constitutionalism 
Gill developed the concept of New Constitutionalism, which is to be placed within the discourse of 
Disciplinary Neoliberalism, representing the political and legal framework of international 
governance. This framework  
 
“(…) seeks to separate economic policies from broad political accountability in 
order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces 
and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and 
processes”                      (Gill 1998) 
 
Based on this definition, New Constitutionalism constitutes a type of ‘neoliberalism through 
depolitization’, presented also by Assistant Professor Aaron Major who claims it to conceptualise a 
neoliberal phase, where political power is being moved from institutions prone to public scrutiny 
and debate to an insulated technocracy far away from democratic accountability (Major 2012). 
This kind of change of economic liberalisation is not necessarily one of deregulation, according to 
Gill, but a restructuring of the state through depolitization, while Major states that this phase is 
not one of deregulation, but rather one of re-regulation, now with the regulatory power in the 
hands of technocrats (Gill 1998, Major 2012).   
Gill backs up the concept with empirics from the EU integration, where the political development 
of the EMU and the European Community has involved ideas of “binding constraints on the 
freedom of manoeuvre of (future) member governments to freely make fiscal and monetary policy”  
(Gill 1993: 10). Herein lies what Gill refers to as a central objective of the New Constitutionalism, 
which is to prevent the undoing of this divide by future governments. This is done through 
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redefining the relation between politics and economics, and specifically the terms of political 
regulation in a capitalist society, and by institutionalising it through reforms.  
Gill finds the placing of monetary politics into the hands of the central banks, including the ECB, 
which is designed to keep inflation rates low, as a means towards institutionalising a) an 
independent and technocratic entity for monetary matters, and b) a monetarist strategy of 
economic growth, resembling the force of the discourse of Disciplinary Neoliberalism.  
According to Gill, New Constitutionalism had a very strong dominance across political divides in 
the initial phase of the EMU, where even “(...) all the left-wing governing parties in the European 
Union (with the possible exception of the French) seem to operate within the new constitutionalist 
assumptions” (Gill 1998).   
 
2.3 Choice of theory 
Gill’s interpretation of Neo-Gramscianism is chosen in this project, as his approach offers 
specific explanations to why an institution like the ECB would have a changed role in a current 
European context and towards what forces would drive such a change. Gill is complemented with 
other Neo-Gramscian perspectives, where especially Aaron Major’s concept of neoliberalism as 
depolitization is included, as this concept is found useful for operationalising some of Gill’s 
concepts that have been given an important impact in this research.  
Neo-Gramscian European integration theory is developed as an alternative to the traditional 
integration theories of Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism. To justify why the Neo-
Gramscian approach has been chosen, below is an outline of how this stands in juxtaposition 
against these two theories.   
Neo-functionalism defines integration as taking place when economic profit from transnational 
cooperation is found. Interconnection between sectors is seen as crucial to the integration 
process, where one type of spill-over into a sector sets in motion other types of spill-overs in the 
same or other sectors, thus expanding the scope of the European integration. Among the actors 
within this process are non-governmental ones, which also to some extent supersede states. Ernst 
B. Haas takes this expectation further, and envisions a dissolving of the entire European state 
system through the integration process (Ryner 2012). Generally, neo-functionalism is criticised for 
ignoring the surrounding structure of the integration process, and of its deterministic view on 
further integration as inevitable (Bieler & Morton, 2001: 13-17).   
Intergovernmentalism considers nation states to be the only significant actors. These states are 
seen to “pursue rationalist policies of power maximization and security enhancement in order to 
ensure their survival”, and do it through capability distribution among states (Bieler & Morton, 
2001: 14). While intergovernmentalism takes international structures into account, unlike neo-
functionalism, its perception of states as the only important actors makes this surrounding 
structure be limited towards that of states structures (Bieler & Morton, 2001: 14-17).   
While representing very different views of surrounding structures, this is where both theories 
fall short of explanatory power in a current context. More specifically, to consider current events 
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of European integration and claim these to be insulated from the global financial crisis seems a bit 
off. Magnus Ryner elaborates on this, and claims the force of the financial crisis to be a ‘blind-
spot’, not within the borders of, and not obeying to, the orthodox traditional integration theories, 
whereby scholars within these traditions are intolerant towards even researching it (Ryner 2012). 
Instead, as post-Marxist and other theories consider arbitrariness itself as promoting integration, 
these heterodox theories have an advantage in a crisis relation like this (Ryner 2012). Neo-
Gramscianism is considered here as such a heterodox theory.  
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony stems from a context of being imprisoned by Mussolini during 
the fascism in Italy in 1926. He developed his theory and concepts from an analysis of the two very 
different experiences in the Western European and Russian revolutions in the late 1910s 
(Apeldoorn et.al. 2003 p. 36). 
Compared to this context, the use of Gramsci in a context of the EMU and a period of 1992-
2012 can be criticised as being too far away from the 1930s’ nation-state Italian context, to be 
appropriately applicable. According to Gramsci himself, every concept is elastic and only becomes 
precise when placed in a particular context, providing an argument of justification for using his 
theories in even very different contextual settings of the late 20th century (Cox 1983). Lastly, Neo-
Gramscianism has taken thoughts and concepts from Gramsci and developed them – even made 
new concepts - and applied these to the current historical context. From this and the attention 
towards the importance of the historical context in this research, the use of Neo-Gramscianism 
outside the framework for action that Gramsci’s thoughts were developed seems justified. Using a 
Neo-Gramscian perspective is not to say that there is one clear reading of Gramsci, constituting 
somewhat of a Neo-Gramscian school. Instead, Neo-Gramscian concepts are presented and open 
to different specific interpretations (Bieler & Morton 2001 p. 17).  
While several of Gramsci’s concepts are presented, not all of them are included. ‘Passive 
revolution’, ‘transformismo’, ‘war of movement’ and ‘war of opposition’ are among the concepts 
that are not brought into this section, despite being somewhat core to Gramscian thought. This 
approach to the theory is an active choice based on an assessment of what concepts are most 
useful and would provide the best theoretical framework for an analysis, and for answering the 
research question. As the focus is on the role of the ECB and how that role came about, and not on 
a possible new hegemonic idea or on a new order overthrowing the current one, only concepts 
useful for such an analysis are included.   
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3. Research Design 
With point of departure in the introduction and the theory, the following chapter will outline the 
research design, and demonstrate how we relate the theories to our specific focus; the ECB. The 
research design encompasses the methodology and the method used to conduct the research and 
justify our analytical focus and choice of empiric material.    
 
3.1. Methodology and epistemology - Tracing a Process 
By asking: “Why has the role of ECB changed during the crisis?” different things are implied. As we 
are questioning how the current order has come about, we are tracing a process developing over a 
certain time frame. Moreover, Critical Theory stresses the importance of tracing developments as 
historical specific and explains how they change over time. In research on European Integration, 
the methodology of Process Tracing has often been used, when researching institutional changes 
like the one seen in relation to ECB2.  
Process Tracing was introduced by Alexander George in 1985. It is a qualitative methodology 
concerned with analysing whether a claimed causal relation between X and Y exists in reality 
(Beach & Pedersen 2010: 215). Such a relation could exist between the financial crisis (X) and the 
role of ECB (Y). While other methodologies (especially quantitative) are concerned with proving 
that a change in Y is happening immediately following a change in X, Process Tracing is focusing on 
the empirical fingerprints relating the two factors and thereby how the relation between X and Y 
looks like (Beach & Pedersen 2010: 215). Process Tracing can thus be used to look at the pathway 
to a result. As such, it can be useful when focusing on the pathway connecting the former role of 
the ECB to the current role of ECB.  
According to George, Process Tracing is a way of opening the black box of decision making to 
investigate the stimuli that actors are exposed to, the actual behaviour of actors, the effect of 
various institutional arrangements etc. By this, he challenges the assumption suggesting that 
theories do not need to attend to how the actors came to their decision as long as they behaved 
as if the theory was true. According to George, theories need to involve with empirical testing in 
processes taking place in historical contexts (Bennett 2008). Likewise, Cox believes it to be 
important to be aware of the inside of events, where positivists only see the outside. By this, Cox 
is thinking of the thought-processes of the acting people, and these people’s understanding of the 
structure of relationships within which they lived and acted.  
However, while agreeing on the importance of seeing the inside of events and studying processes, 
Process Tracing still differs from Critical Theory on important matters. Traditionally, Process 
Tracing is used with a deductive method trying to confirm a generalizable theory by transforming 
it into hypotheses about causal mechanisms within specific cases. Later, inductive Process Tracing 
has been introduced, where new generalizable theories are built, inferring new causal 
mechanisms from the basis of empirical material (Beach & Pedersen 2010: 219 ff). While focusing 
                                                 
2
 See ia. Checkel 2005 
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on history, Process Tracing is still used to confirm or build theories, assuming that the institutional 
context is permanent. The focus of Process Tracing is thus to make the theories more specific and 
thereby more useful for policy recommendations. This is not coherent with Critical Theory, which 
rejects theories as being separate of the spatio-temporal context, and aims at challenging current 
policies rather than supporting them.  
Moreover, while the focus might be on the process, Process Tracing is nevertheless anchored in 
positivism and is very much concerned with causal mechanism, relations and variables, leaving it 
with a somehow deterministic epistemology, that only works if holding things in a constant series 
of step, where A causes B; B then causes C, etc. (Checkel 2005, Beach & Pedersen 2010). This does 
not harmonise well with Critical Theory that has an interpretative epistemology, but is instead 
related with the problem-solving theories criticised by Critical Theory.  
 
As such, there is an epistemological conflict, when using Critical Theory and Process Tracing 
together. However, in spite of seeing history as open-ended, Critical Theory still sets out to 
demonstrate how certain social circumstances have come about and is in this way focusing on the 
causes for the state of affair. Moreover, George and Bennett argue that theoretical arguments are 
most often separable from methodological debates, and believe that their method is widely 
applicable. They believe it can incorporate both material and ideational variables, and find it to be 
useful for post-positivists as well, and the use of Process Tracing by post-positivists is also seen in 
rising numbers (Checkel 2005).  
Hence, we still find it relevant and legitimate to use Process Tracing as an inspiration for shaping 
our project design. However, we use it within a more interpretational epistemology, to 
understand the process changing the role of ECB. Therefore, we are not tracing causal 
mechanisms and attempting to confirm theories.   
 
3.2. Process Tracing as a method 
Within Process Tracing, Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen have defined a method called 
Explaining Outcome Process Tracing, which can overcome the problem of generalisation in the 
original forms of Process Tracing. Explaining Outcome Process Tracing is not used to confirm or 
produce theories, but is used for seeking the causes of an outcome in a specific case. It is related 
to Single-Outcome Studies, and the ambition is to create a sufficient explanation of a particular 
outcome (Beach & Pedersen 2011).  
This method fits with the spatio-temporal approach from Critical Theory and the aim with this 
project. In many ways it is similar to much historical research, tracing the process leading up to a 
specific event. However, Beach and Pedersen argue that good Explaining Outcome Process Tracing 
should still be guided by theory and have ambitions beyond the single case, and this differentiates 
the method from historical research (Beach & Pedersen 2011). In the same way, we aim at getting 
answers, which can tell more than just why ECB has gained its power. It is our goal to research 
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specific events in a specific time, while not missing overarching patterns - or formulated 
differently, to look at both the forest and the trees. 
Compared to the other forms of Process Tracing, Explaining Outcome Process Tracing has a much 
broader understanding of ‘causal mechanisms’. This is because the crafting of minimally sufficient 
explanations for a historical outcome often need to combine mechanisms into an eclectic 
conglomerate of mechanism. Also, as this method is regarding a particular outcome you will often 
have to include things that are unique to a particular time and place as mechanisms - also called 
non-systematic mechanisms. Such mechanisms can be the sequence of events and processes that 
lead to the event. These non-systematic mechanisms give the possibility to capture actors’ choice 
and contingency of historical events (Beach & Pedersen 2011). The broader understanding of 
causal mechanisms leaves a bigger leeway to an interpretational analysis of the process, as the 
inclusion of non-causal mechanisms as an explanation is possible. This allows for bigger fluidity 
making it more legitimate to use as a method together with Critical Theory.   
Explaining Outcome Process Tracing can go about in both inductive and deductive ways, trying to 
reach the minimal sufficient explanation of the specific case. In these paths, the methods from 
inductive or deductive Process Tracing are followed respectively. Explaining Outcome Process 
Tracing can also be done taking only different deductive paths or different inductive paths. The 
paths are taken until a sufficient explanation has been reached (Beach & Pedersen 2011).  
 
3.2.1 The inductive path and choice of empirical focus 
The inductive path is often chosen as the first path when studying phenomena which are little 
studied or little explained by theories. It is often compared to detective work, where we know the 
outcome, but try to work our way backwards, going through different evidence to uncover what 
produced the outcome (Beach & Pedersen 2011, Bennett 2008: 496, Bennett & Checkel 2012).  
However, with basis in Critical Theory no research can be done completely inductive, as 
researchers always have preconceptions which will affect the collection of data. In line with this, 
the sifting through evidence has deductive elements and theory can inspire to look in a certain 
direction - much like the detective, we have prior theories which guide the investigation of the 
case.  
 
Initially in our project, we sensed that the role of the ECB had changed, for instance when Draghi 
suddenly claimed himself able to save the euro. Thus, we knew the outcome, but we did not know 
the specific cause. Therefore, an inductive path was chosen to research which mechanisms had 
created this change. Before we would be able to answer why the ECB had changed, we needed to 
find out what had changed the ECB. This was done by outlining the institutional and structural 
mandate and political power of the ECB that would make it able to change itself. A special focus 
has been put on the time period since the beginning of the crisis, as the role of ECB seems to have 
pivoted in this period, while unstable times with uncertainty among powers favour Critical Theory.  
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This way of starting inductive research is often called “soaking and poking”, as researchers often 
take in a lot of information, where not all will later become part of the explanation (Bennett & 
Checkel 2012: 22).  
 
3.2.2 Initiatives – and their interrelations 
Our soaking and poking has led us to several initiatives taken inside the EMU during the financial 
crisis. Three types have been chosen, as we find these to be important for the changed role of the 
ECB. These are the crisis funds EFSF and ESM; the new fiscal regulations known as the Six-pack and 
Fiscal Compact; and the Outright Monetary Transactions, a non-standard measure taken by the 
ECB. A fourth, the Single Supervisory Mechanism was found to be important as well, but as the 
proposal will not be adopted before December 2012, it has been included only as an epilogue. 
From this, this project has gone through somewhat of an inductive path in the initial research to 
find initiatives that might have had a big influence on - or was influenced by, the ECB. The 
initiatives are all taken during the crisis, but are affecting different policy areas. This allows us to 
look at different aspect of the crisis solving and get a more holistic perspective of the ECB’s 
changed role.  
 
In an ECB working paper, Drudi et. al. (2012) introduces a figure of the mutual trinity, between 
fiscal, financial and price stability.  
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(Drudi. et al 2012: 18) 
 
The three types of stabilities are interdependent, while being affected by, amongst others, the 
initiatives we focus upon (Drudi. et al 2012: 18). From this, the initiatives chosen for this project 
are seen to be interrelated. Moreover, the initiatives are placed differently within the trinity, 
which allows us to look at the ECB’s influence on each specific stability.     
 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was established in May 2010, while the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) is meant to take over in June 2013. These crisis funds were established 
to provide loans and buy bonds to help the EMU member states in financial distress. Reading from 
the figure, this has no direct relation on the ECB, however it is involved in these funds on an 
observatory basis and through a provision of technical assistance. In return for the loans and bond 
purchases, the EFSF and ESM require rather strict conditionality in the form of austerity measures 
and adjustment programs designed by the Troika, which ECB is a part of. In this way it can reflect 
ECB’s changed role in relation to financial and fiscal stability. Moreover, affecting the financial and 
fiscal stabilities, the ESM and EFSF also have an indirect influence on price stability (ECB, July 
2011). 
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On a fiscal policy level, the European Commission, in December 2011, agreed on a new legislation 
known as the Six-pack. It reinforced the ideas of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), established 
as part of the EMU completion, which had not been followed by the member states. This new 
legislation is supposed to help increase coordinated fiscal policies within the member states (Buti 
& Carnot 2012) and is meant to strengthen budgetary surveillance, as well as monitoring and 
controlling macroeconomic imbalances. The other initiative to correct the SGP is the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), which will enter into force on January 1st 2013. Of 
particular importance in this intergovernmental agreement is the Fiscal Compact, which requires 
parties to respect and live up to the SGP on a legal basis.   
The new fiscal initiatives affect the fiscal and price stability. The ECB does not have a direct 
influence on the new fiscal agreements, and while the EMU extended the authority of monetary 
policy to the ECB, the fiscal policies stayed at national level. However, the fiscal policy affects the 
work of ECB and thus their role. Moreover it highlights the relation between the ECB and 
government policy, and the ECB has a strong opinion on how the fiscal policy should be 
conducted.  
 
The Outright Money Transaction (OMT) is a non-standard measure, which allows the ECB to 
purchase bonds after being sold to investors by the governments (ECB Mar. 26th, 2012). This gives 
the ECB the chance to buy sovereign debt on its own. It is not highlighted in the figure, but is 
located within the ECB and is mainly focused on price-stability, but is affecting the other two. 
Moreover, as it is a measure taken by the ECB it allows us to focus on its own agency and how it is 
stretching its mandate.  
 
As shown, the initiatives enable us to look at different aspects of the ECB’s changing role, thereby 
enabling us to make somewhat of a holistic analysis. The initiatives can be regarded as non-
systematic mechanisms as they are all specific to the spatiotemporal context, which we are 
researching. We do not see them as a causal chain, where one leads to the other, which leads to 
the other. Rather we see them as mutually constituting the change in the ECB’s role. As such, they 
are seen as the analytical objects, where we need to direct our focus.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical material 
The limit for what can be used as empirical material in Process Tracing is small. Almost any kind of 
qualitative material can be used as evidence, ranging from interviews to memos, while being 
relentless in tracing down primary sources. Process Tracing rests on logic, where one should seek 
diverse and independent streams of empiric material which can test the causal relation. This is 
similar to the logic behind triangulation of data, and in Process Tracing it is needed to do cross 
checking between distinct streams of data (Bennett & Checkel 2012: 33ff). In our case, we will 
have to look on the treaties, while interviews and speeches can give an impression of why they 
have been installed.  
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3.2.4 The deductive path and strategy for analysis 
After first taking the inductive path, it is possible to proceed down the inductive path or change to 
a deductive path. As the theories presented in foregoing chapter can explain how changes come 
about, they are used to proceed on a deductive path to interpret why the role of ECB has changed 
through the different initiatives.   
Deductive Process Tracing can break down the process into different factors. This is done by the 
use of theory, which infers different factors which can connect x with y (Beach & Pedersen 2010: 
219ff). By walking the inductive path we have already broken the process of the ECB’s changing 
role down into the three initiatives. These constitute some of the factors that have contributed to 
the change of the ECB, thereby exemplifying this development. Through our theory, we can find 
explanations of why it has changed and thereby interpret the three initiatives to reach an answer 
on our research question. More than the research question, the analysis will need to be guided by 
the working questions to reach a sufficient conclusion.  
 
Before going into debt with the initiatives, Critical Theory requires that a framework for action is 
developed. Therefore, prior to the analysis of initiatives, we make a historisation and 
contextualisation answering the first working question: What was the role of the ECB in the EMU 
before the crisis – its intended role? Through this, we seek to understand the development of the 
EMU and the ideology behind, while the importance of context requires us to understand the 
current financial crisis. This is also important, as we need to understand what ECB’s role was and 
what context it is changing within, before we can trace a change in their role.  
Proceeding to the analysis of the initiatives, the second working question asks “What impact has 
the crisis solving mechanisms had on the role of the ECB?” This will involve an analysis of each of 
the specific initiatives. It will relate to the hegemony of Disciplinary Neoliberalism, and how the 
change of ECB’s role relates to its strategy and the struggle to maintain it. Simultaneously, we will 
also interpret the developments in the context of New Constitutionalism which can explain the 
transfer of power, to technocratic entities like the ECB. We need to investigate what power this 
development gives to the ECB, but also how the ECB’s attitude towards the initiatives is, as this 
will reflect ECB’s ideas as part of the hegemony.  
Proceeding from the analysis of the specific initiatives we need assess the last working question 
asking “What forces have made these changes come about?” This question relates directly to Cox’s 
forces of social change, and each of these (ideas, institutions and material capabilities) will be 
analysed separately. The social forces can be identified in relation between the historical context 
in ‘framework for action’ and the chosen theory and empirical material, and therefore this analysis 
will need to involve with all the preceding analyses and our theoretical framework. It will 
constitute the last part of the analysis pointing towards the conclusion.  
3.2.5 Scope 
As mentioned, a critique of Critical Theory is its lacking capacity to provide general answers. A 
similar critique is directed towards Explaining Outcome Process Tracing (Cox 1981, Bennett & 
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Checkel 2012). This can be recognised as a problem of equifinality, where a given end state can be 
reached by different paths. The consequence of this is that no claim can be made that whatever 
relation we find between the financial crisis and the changing role of the ECB is the only one and 
other relations can possibly exist. The analysis should thus be understood within the scope set 
here.  
We have chosen to have the so-called Delors-committee and the Maastricht Treaty as our starting 
point. With reference to Critical Theory’s requirement of history, this point is chosen because the 
Maastricht Treaty is installing the ECB and integrates the monetary policy in the Eurozone. The 
treaty was based upon the work done by the Delors committee, why we also include this. 
Afterwards, we present an outline of the years passing from the complete implementation of the 
EMU in 1999, and its expansion to include additional countries.  
Following that, we move to the current crisis and use that as our framework for the analysis of the 
three initiatives. The temporal ending point of our analysis is the 12th September 2012, which is 
the day that the Single Supervisory Mechanism was proposed by the European Commission. This 
point has been chosen as a practical measure, as it is the latest big proposal before our research 
began. And the proposal could possibly influence the role of the ECB significantly.  
As this research focuses on the change in the ECB this will be the institution in EU, which we direct 
our attention to. Other EU-institutions will be included as well, as they are seen as having an 
influence on the change of the ECB, but this will not be processed with similar thoroughness. The 
main focus will be on the European level, and national actors will mainly be included when they 
act on this stage. Since the ECB is a monetarist institution, we are required to go into this policy 
area, however, we delimit ourselves from the more mathematical aspects and technical reasoning 
behind the policy. The focus is on the global political economy, and we will rather focus on the 
more ideational reasonings. 
   
3.3 Sum up and project design 
This project takes it basis in Critical Theory and uses Explaining Outcome Process Tracing as the 
method. This is done as these approaches are found useful for analysing the change in ECB in a 
critical manner. Both are aware of the historical process and context, and insist on analysing the 
inside of events. The classical way of using Critical Theory and Process Tracing is conflicting in the 
aim of the analysis, but we believe that this can be overcome by using Explaining Outcome Process 
Tracing. This requires us to take inductive or deductive paths to reach the minimal sufficient 
explanation.  
Currently, we have taken the inductive path leading to the three initiatives which constitute our 
analytical focus. The rest of the project will mainly follow a deductive path based on Neo-
Gramscian perspectives, while still being open to inductive insights. As such, the project will 
proceed in following manner:  
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4. Analysis   
As outlined above, here is first the analysis of the historical framework for action, followed by the 
initiatives.   
 
4.1 Historical framework  
 
It is widely discussed, what created the final incentives for establishing the EMU. Already in the 
1970’s an attempt on creating a monetary union was made, but failed. However, during the 
1980’s, first a European Monetary System became operational, which aimed at creating exchange 
rate stability; and second, the launching of the internal markets programme created free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital. Based on this, an EMU was deemed necessary 
(Verdun 1999).  
The final decision to create the EMU was taken at the Maastricht summit. In the run-up to the 
summit, a committee chaired by EC President Jacque Delors became powerful in forming the 
EMU. The committee came to be known as the ‘Delors Committee‘ and was entrusted to study 
and propose the different stages leading towards the EMU. Besides Delors, the committee 
consisted of the twelve members in the Committee of Central Bank Governors; a member of the 
Commission, a General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a professor of 
economics and the President of Banco Exterior de España (Verdun 1999). This composition meant 
that the committee was technocratic, and it expresses that a depoliticized unity was behind the 
initial thoughts and design of the EMU.   
At that time, central bankers were the greatest promoters of monetarism (De Grauwe 2009: 167f), 
and the members in the Delors committee were part of a broad group of experts believing 
monetary policy to be most effective if carried out by an independent central bank with price 
stability as its main objective (Verdun 1999), This consensus had been developed transnationally 
through the Atlanticist forum associated with e.g. BIS and IMF (Gill 2003: 63). The ideas of these 
experts had a great influence because of their ‘objective knowledge’ about monetary policies, but 
also because of their institutional position, where their recommendations were valued by the 
outside world. In this way, the Delors Committee could be understood as consisting of ‘organic 
intellectuals’ to the economic actors on this level, as opposed to Gramsci’s civil society focus. As 
such, they produced ideas stemming from the economic community, with the EMU as a potential 
hegemonic political system having a chance to also restructure the political and social spheres.  
 
Stemming from the elite consensus, the Delors Committee was guided by a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs. Moreover they shared causal beliefs, based on common 
experiences and analysis of practice (Verdun 1999). Together, they believed in a further economic 
and monetary integration as a beneficial development, provided the integration was based on a 
range of principles. The low inflation objective was the most important objective, and the Delors 
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Committee believed an independent central bank, shielded from political influence, was needed 
to protect the objective, while also ensuring policy effectiveness. This is known as a German model 
of a central bank as opposed to the Anglo-French version, where the bank had other objectives 
than price stability, like employment, and where the Minister of Finance could set the interest rate 
(De Grauwe 2009: 165). The decision by the Delors committee to shape the ECB after the 
Bundesbank was a new deal for many banks in the European Community, as they were still obliged 
to accept instructions from their national governments at that point (Verdun 1999). However, it 
followed the general elite consensus where the Bundesbank was an embodiment of the preferred 
monetarist paradigm. 
Moreover, Germany feared higher inflation if entering into the EMU and insisted that the ECB 
should be even more fierce than the Bundesbank in battling inflation, and the German Central 
Bank President Karl-Otto Pöhl succeeded in following this through (De Grauwe 2009: 167f).  
With the focus on low inflation and depolitization of monetary politics, the Delors Committee 
introduced the ideas of Disciplinary Neoliberalism and New Constitutionalism in the EMU, already 
prior to its birth.  
The Delors Committee did not suggest any fiscal authority of the EMU, which would also have 
been an unlikely recommendation from a community consisting of central bankers (Verdun 1999). 
However, they were some of the first to express the need for strict rules on budgetary policy, 
following the line of Disciplinary Neoliberalism (De Grauwe 2009: 230).  
 
4.1.1 The Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. It was subject to intense negotiations and lobbying, and 
it has been widely discussed what formed the final result. Nevertheless, the rather monetarist 
suggestion made by the Delors Committee was more or less directly adopted into the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), which was the centre piece of the Maastricht Treaty (Verdun 1999). 
According to Gill, the EMU was not only supported by a financial elite, but from across the social 
forces, and together, these supporters formed a transnational historic bloc seeking to embed the 
neoliberal hegemony. The EMU tasked an independent European Central Bank with the objective 
of price stability, while outlining a set of rules for the fiscal policies in the member states. As such, 
the monetary policies were transferred to the supranational EU-level. Meanwhile, the economic 
part of the union stayed at national level and thus required the consent of the countries.  
The EMU was created and developed with the intention of integrating financial markets of the 
member states, removing foreign exchange costs and risks, thereby enabling an effective and 
competitive market across borders. The idea was that a monetary union and a common currency 
would create economic and monetary stability all over Europe (ECB 2011, 7ff). Gill believes that 
the Maastricht Treaty extended the principle of the neoliberal discourse to the European 
integration (Gill 1998, 2003: 6). 
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4.1.1.1 Adoption and convergence criteria 
The adoption into the EMU was based on two principles: The transition would be gradual and 
extending over several years; and entry into the union was conditional on the convergence 
criteria.  
The EMU was introduced in three waves: First, the on-going wave (1990-1993), was fully 
integrating the markets into one by removing internal barriers to the free movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services; second (1994-1998), the technical preparations for a single currency 
and convergence of economic and monetary policies of member states; and third (1999-2002), the 
introduction of the single currency, the euro, and the transfer of monetary policy competences to 
a European Central Bank (ECB) (ECB 2011; 5). 
 
The so-called ‘convergence criteria’ referred to a list of preconditions for joining the Eurozone: 
1) Inflation was not to exceed 1,5% in the year before examination 
2) Government budget deficit was not to be ‘excessive’ 
3) The country was not to have devaluated its currency two years prior to the 
examination 
4) The long-term interest rate was not to exceed 2% compared to the three best 
performing member states (Maastricht Treaty 1992).    
 
The convergence criteria were set to ensure that countries would lead sound economic policies 
oriented towards stability and were able to prove good results in price stability (ECB 2011). They 
were also to create alignment between the member states.  
In 1998, 11 EU countries were found to live up to the convergence criteria and soon after Greece 
followed as number 12 (De Grauwe 2009: 145). Future countries applying for membership would 
have to prove a high degree of sustained convergence based on the criteria. Once a country had 
entered the union, there was no provision in the Maastricht Treaty to give up the currency again 
(FT.com July 13th 2001). However, there was no supranational institution able to prevent members 
from seceding either. Therefore, the union was dependent on the member states perceiving their 
membership to be of their interest. As a result, the union was dependent on the consent of the 
member states (De Grauwe 2006).  
 
4.1.1.2. Once in the union 
With the introduction of the euro in 1999, all setting of interest and exchange rates were 
transferred to the ECB. Meanwhile, the sustainability of economic governance was to be ensured 
by the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP), setting rules for the maximum deficit allowed at 3%, and 
the maximum debt at 60%. These were complemented with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 
1997, which specified which steps to be followed if deficits had been acknowledged to be 
excessive. 
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According to current members of the Commission; Marco Buti and Nicolas Carnot (2012) the 
rationales behind the policy in the Maastricht Treaty was that:  
 
 “In a monetary union, while a clear mandate and safeguards from political 
interference bring the central bank credibility, common provisions for 
budgetary discipline are justified to the extent that unsustainable fiscal 
dynamics in one country may eventually entail costs borne by all EMU 
participants.” 
 
As such, inflationary debt monetisation or large fiscal transfers between member states were not 
accepted. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty entailed two no-bail-out clauses prohibiting 
respectively monetary financing of budget deficit and intergovernmental bail-out. This left a big 
role to the markets, as it was expected that efficient financial markets would price in default risk 
premiums in the event of unsound policies, when there were no possibilities for bail-out (Buti & 
Carnot 2012).  
According to Gill, the restrictions of fiscal policy were made to avoid currency turbulence. At the 
same time, it ensured the credibility of governments towards the financial markets. This 
hegemony involved a restructuring, where the market – not the state - should restore the 
economy, thereby helping New Constitutionalism and Disciplinary Neoliberalism gain strength (Gill 
2001: 47).  
 
4.1.1.3 The ECB 
In the midst of the EMU was the ECB. In line with the Maastricht Treaty, the primary objective of 
the ECB was to maintain price stability. In a second row came the support to the general economic 
policies in the EMU, securing an open market with free competition (Maastricht Treaty, 1992; Art. 
105). However, this could never conflict with the objective of price stability and according to the 
ECB:   
 
“In the long run a central bank can only contribute to raising the growth 
potential of the economy by maintaining an environment of stable prices. It 
cannot enhance economic growth by expanding the money supply or keeping 
short-term interest rates at a level inconsistent with price stability”  
(ecb.europa.eu) 
 
This highlights that the monetarist paradigm of the Delors Committee gained foothold in the EMU. 
As such, the ECB followed the German model rather than the Anglo-French model, where the 
central bank had several objectives like high employment and financial stability, and where the 
objective of price stability did not precede these.    
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The ECB defined price stability to be inflation kept below but close to two percent (ECB 2011; 20f).  
As a mean for controlling the monetary policy, it received the exclusive right to authorise the issue 
of euro bank notes, which became the only notes legally tender in the EMU (Maastricht Treaty 
1992: Art. 105a). This monopoly is a powerful tool for the ECB to control the amount of money 
available in the monetary system, as well as it deprives the member states from this important 
tool, especially useful in times of crisis.  
Other central monetary policy instruments of the ECB has been refinancing operations, where 
private financial institutions make bids for a certain amount of liquidity in exchange for delivering 
collateral (De Grauwe 2009: 216). By changing the interest rate for the loans, the ECB can adjust 
the markets’ interest rate, while changing the amount of money allotted affects the amount of 
liquidity on the market. The short term for the loans allowed the ECB to adjust the monetary 
conditions continually. The ECB also has other open market operations, and is able to make 
structural operations through reverse transactions, outright transactions and issuance of debt 
certificates (ECB 2011; 21f, De Grauwe 2009: 216). 
Besides implementing the monetary policy of the Eurozone, the basic tasks of the ECB was 
originally to conduct foreign exchange operations, hold and manage the foreign reserves of the 
member states and to promote a smooth operation of payment systems (Maastricht Treaty 1992: 
Art. 105).  
 
4.1.1.4 Independence and accountability of the ECB 
The independence of the ECB was also stated in the Maastricht Treaty, and the ECB should not 
take instructions from any of the institutions in the EU or from any member states. This is again in 
line with the German central bank model, as opposed to the Anglo-French model, where the 
central bank is politically dependent.  
The ECB is governed by a Governing Council, and its policies are implemented by the Executive 
Board, which consists of a President, a Vice President and four other members. They are all 
appointed by common accord of the governments of the member states after a recommendation 
from the EU Council, which beforehand needs to consult the European Parliament and the 
Governing Council of the ECB (Maastricht Treaty 1992: Art. 109 a+b). The Governing Council 
consists of governors from the national central banks of the member countries and the members 
of the Executive Board. Each has one vote and the decisions are taken by simple majority. In the 
event of a tie, the President has the casting vote. The central bank governors have a term of office 
of five years, while the members of the Executive Board have terms of office on eight years.  
Functionally, the ECB is also independent. It has all the instruments for implementing an efficient 
monetary policy. Further, to shield it from the influence of public authorities, the ECB is not 
allowed to grant loans to Community bodies or national public sectors (Maastricht Treaty 1992 
Art. 107).  
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The ECB President has to appear regularly in front of the European Parliament to be held 
accountable for the policy of the ECB. The Parliament, however, has no power to change the 
statutes of the ECB, as this would require a revision of the Maastricht Treaty, and thus unanimity 
between all member states. This is contrary to the Federal Reserve in USA, where the Congress 
can change the statute of the Federal Reserve by simple majority. Compared to the Federal 
Reserve, ECB is more independent and less accountable (De Grauwe 2009: 173).   
 
The ECB’s mandate is defined in the Maastricht Treaty:  
 
“The primary objective of the ESCB3 shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2. The 
ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with 
free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 3a. 
 
The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: to define and 
implement the monetary policy of the Community” 
(Maastricht Treaty 1992: Ch. 2, Art. 105) 
 
From this, the ECB itself has been given the power to define ‘price stability’, while the other 
objectives are so vague, that it is difficult to define what they are, and thus hard to monitor. This is 
quite unusual, as officials, who are democratically accountable, most often set the objectives, 
while the bank then has to pursue these objectives. Further, referring to the Maastricht Treaty, 
the ECB believes it should not publish minutes and voting for meetings, which would otherwise 
give the public an insight in the reasoning behind the choices made in the central bank, which is 
done in e.g. the Federal Reserve (De Grauwe 2009: 174ff). From this outline, the ECB is shielded 
from public scrutiny, and has as such been depoliticized since its birth.  
4.1.2 The first 10 years of the EMU 
After its implementation, the EMU did help financially stabilising all the member states, through 
the somewhat similar credit ratings of them due to their common currency. Because there were 
collective rules for them, the financial markets did not differ between the sovereign assets across 
the EMU. Being part of the stable and controlled EMU, they were treated all over the Eurozone by 
the investors as almost risk free (Buti & Carnot 2012). However, the currency transformation into 
the euros had negative consequences for some of the member states. Due to the low value of 
especially Spanish, Italian and Portuguese currencies, the exchange into Euros meant that their 
commodity prices went up, without the commodities being improved or added more value. This 
                                                 
3
 ESCB = European System of Central Banks, which consists of ECB and the national central banks 
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tendency was opposite what happened to a country like Germany, whose exchange rate to the 
euro was low, which indirectly created a depreciation compared to the D-Mark. This gave 
Germany a competitive advantage due to lower wages, which decreased its import demand and 
increased its export and thus balance of payments. This happened at the expense of the Southern 
European countries, which now lost a big export market and were outmatched by cheap German 
import products (Overbeek 2012). As shown in the charts below, Germany and Greece benefited 
and suffered respectively on the current account balances from joining the EMU.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Southern governments had no options for devaluation, due to the single monetary policy of 
the EMU, which could otherwise have helped their competitiveness. The only tools available were 
politically unpopular wage suppressions to become able to compete with cheap products and halt 
import, or increased budget deficits because the revenue from export would continue to be lower 
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than the expenses from import. When the latter was easily accessible due to low interest rates on 
the European capital markets, this easily became the option chosen. This financing mechanism 
made the Southern countries develop high levels of budget and account deficits (Overbeek 2012). 
As Professor of International Relations at the University of Amsterdam, Henk Overbeek concludes, 
“the introduction of the euro thus led not to convergence but to divergence in the eurozone” 
(Overbeek 2012).  
 
4.1.3 The 2008 financial crisis 
In 2008, the US Federal Reserve refused to bail-out the country’s fourth biggest investment bank; 
the Lehman Brothers. Just a week before, the government had nationalised the two government 
sponsored mortgage-lending agencies; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and shortly after it had to 
nationalise the world’s biggest insurance company American International Group. These actions 
symbolise the turning point that triggered a panic and a crash in the financial system starting in 
the US, spreading through the international financial markets (Helleiner 2011).  
  
A great deal of many and complex financial transactions had been based, one way or the other, on 
the constant rise in especially US housing prices, creating a financial housing bubble. When the 
housing prices declined in 2006, the bubble burst, and a growing number of especially subprime 
mortgages started to default. Banks in both the US and Europe started to lose money due to this, 
and started to pull back their domestic credit from abroad to cover their deficits. This hit the 
countries with already big debts and budget deficits particularly hard, as they had no liquidity to 
live up to the sudden pay-out, while they also faced a challenge in the stop of future loans from 
the creditor countries, to cover their continued interest rate expenses. All of this meant that banks 
stopped lending to each other, to investors and to private people, in order to ensure their own 
liquidity, constituting a freeze of the financial system and a credit crisis (Helleiner 2011).  
Central banks in the US and around the Eurozone tried to avert the credit crises. They started 
bailing-out or nationalising commercial banks to avoid bankruptcies, while also creating stimulus 
packages to the banks, all of which led to sovereign debt (Overbeek 2012). In 2012, the 
accumulated Eurozone debt was at the highest of its time:  
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This high sovereign debt level posed a risk to the banks that had invested in government bonds, as 
a risk of state bankruptcy was increased, whereby the creditor banks could lose their credit 
(Overbeek 2012).    
As such, this high debt level did not need to pose a crisis situation. As long as the interest rates 
were low, a high debt was reasonably affordable. What created the problem was that mistrust had 
evolved in for instance the Greek banks and government’s ability to pay back loans on the longer 
term. This and subsequent speculation made the interest rates for Greek bonds increase, as a way 
for financial market investors to shield themselves from the risk of a Greek bankruptcy (Overbeek 
2012).    
 
The ECB began buying sovereign debt from countries like Greece and Portugal for the first time in 
its existence in May 2010, which the Wall Street Journal refers to as “the most controversial 
decision in the central bank's 12-year history” (Wall Street Journal, June 11th, 2010). The 
indignation was based upon the mandate of the ECB, which not clearly included bonds purchase. 
Also, the ECB had injected money into the banks through Long Term Refinancing Operations. 
These have developed in amount and time limits culminating in December 2011 and February 
2012 with two rounds of loans, which together were worth €1000 billion, had an interest on 1% 
and could last up till 36 months (Cœuré Mar. 26th 2012). 
 
4.1.4 Coherence between crisis and the EMU structure 
As outlined above, some countries in the Eurozone already had high levels of debt and balance of 
payments deficits, Greece being a key example. For these countries, the increasing interest rates 
created an actual sovereign debt crisis. In Greece, the debt level reached 170% of GDP in 2012. 
From the chart below, it is also clear that Greece never – not even when it was integrated into the 
Eurozone in 2001 - lived up to the Excessive Debt Procedure of a debt on maximum 60% of GDP. 
This was possible, because the government hid some of their debt to qualify as an EMU member 
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state, and did so with the help of the American financial institution; Goldman Sachs (Spiegel.de 
Aug. 2nd 2010).4 This only adds to the flaws and divergence of the EMU system, and maybe to the 
mentality about helping out Greece today.  
 
 
 
4.1.6 Summary of Historical Framework 
The ECB had a rather important role in the original EMU system from its establishment in 1999. 
This rested on ideas from the Maastricht Treaty, where monetarism was seen as the best way to 
ensure financial stability, and where the German Bundesbank was the mirror in which the ECB was 
designed. On this basis, its intended role was to be an independent central bank, in charge of a 
monetary policy, and with the objective of keeping inflation rates down and prices stable. Digging 
deeper into the features of these characteristics, the independence entailed that the ECB was 
governed by central bankers, and that it was shielded from political pressure. Likewise, the ‘price 
stability’ mandate was so vaguely formulated that ways to ensure it were somewhat up to the ECB 
to define.  
Then came the crisis. The European sovereign debt crisis was caused by multiple factors, and not 
all were stemming from the external shock of the financial crisis.  
This revealed the original structure of the EMU as flawed and financially unsustainable, and 
thereby looking to crash on its own, while the external crisis only triggered this inescapable faith. 
At this stage, the ECB somehow had its back covered, having been able to keep its mandated 
monetary system under control. 
 
 
                                                 
4 According to Spiegel, the deal involved “so-called cross-currency swaps in which government debt issued in dollars 
and yen was swapped for euro debt for a certain period -- to be exchanged back into the original currencies at a later 
date” (Spiegel.de Aug. 2nd 2012) 
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4.2 Crisis Funds 
This part of the analysis will start with an outlining of the content of each of the two crisis funds 
and their relation to each other. As the ESM is taking over for the EFSF, and as several institutional 
setups of the two are similar, the ESM will be presented in more detail and will include these 
technicalities.   
 
4.2.1. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
Greece was the first Eurozone country ever to be bailed-out. This happened in May 2010, when 
different Eurozone countries provided it with bilateral funding, coupled with IMF loans, in a rather 
unstructured way, and thereby violated the no bail-out clause prohibiting intergovernmental 
transfers (Euobserver.com (Sep. 12th 2012). After this, a need for a facility to stabilise the 
Eurozone markets was deemed necessary: 
 
“Our mandate is to safeguard financial stability in the Eurozone by raising 
funds in capital markets to finance loans for euro area member state within 
the framework of a macro-economic adjustment programme”  
(efsf.europa.eu) 
 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was established as a private company owned by the 
countries of the Eurozone in May 2010, and was fully operational in August the same year, as a 
loan based financial assistance facility (EFSF Press Release Aug. 4th 2010). Loans from the EFSF 
helped Greece, Portugal and Ireland through some of their financial difficulties. In July 2012, the 
instruments for support were widened to include purchase of debt bonds of distressed countries 
in primary and secondary markets, useful to precautionary facilities and finance for 
recapitalisation of financial institutions (EFSF Framework Agreement 2011).  
The financial capabilities of the EFSF were based on Eurozone countries’ irrevocable and 
unconditional guarantee commitments, which were at a total of around €780 billion, in the 
original framework agreement. These gave the EFSF a lending capacity of €440 billion to the 
member states. Of this, €211 billion were provided by Germany, which made the country the 
biggest contributor by far, giving €60 billion more than the French at the second place (EFSF 
Framework Agreement 2011). The guarantees had to be approved by the national Parliaments 
before issuance, and loans had to be approved by 90% of the shareholding countries – meaning 
that states with the most money invested in the EFSF would have the most say in giving loans 
(EFSF Framework Agreement 2011). Due to this, Germany for instance had a determining say in 
the loans and additional programs, with its 27% of the total amount guaranteed (EFSF Framework 
Agreement 2011, Annex I).  
It was quickly realised that the temporary EFSF was incapable of providing the stability needed of 
the Eurozone in the longer run. According to Karl Strauch, a German official referred to as the right 
hand of the Chief Executive Officer:   
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"The initial idea was that the EFSF would never be activated (…) But then came 
Ireland. And from then on there was a continuous flow of new things coming 
in, broadening the scope of the EFSF, then creating the ESM" 
(euobserver.com Sep. 12th 2012) 
 
If the EFSF originally was not meant for being used, there must have been other intentions than 
bailing out countries. In a Financial Times interview in 2011, Mario Draghi claimed that one of the 
most important ways to reassure credibility, was to have the EFSF in place as a financial firewall 
(FT.com Sep. 18th 2011). This follows from general mistrust in markets and speculation in whether 
highly indebted countries will slip into insolvency and if the value of the euro is going down. This 
can be battled with the message sent by establishing the EFSF, and therefore it should not only be 
regarded as a tool for giving loans inwards, but also as a tool to restore credibility outwards. As 
such, the idea of the EFSF also aims at reassuring private investors’ confidence, and is thereby 
disciplined by the market in line with Disciplinary Neoliberalism.    
 
4.2.2 European Stability Mechanism (ESM)   
Only a few months after the establishment of the EFSF, the plans about establishing the ESM 
started. The ESM is a permanent intergovernmental lending facility established with a total 
lending capacity of €500 billion, and an authorised capital stock of €700 Billion (ESM Treaty 2012). 
The ESM will assume the tasks currently fulfilled by the EFSF and the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism.5 It was agreed upon in December 2010 and is expected into force in July 
2013. It has not provided any loans yet, but assistance can be requested after July 2013.  
The mandate is based upon the stability risks of the Eurozone, where one country’s instability can 
contagion the rest of the region due to them being so closely financially related. The financial 
instruments available for this are loans and bond purchases on the primary and secondary 
markets. These can be provided also as precautionary financial assistance, and as assistance for 
the recapitalisation of financial institutions (ESM Treaty 2012).  
 
The decision making mandate lies with a Board of Governors, consisting of the Finance Ministers 
of the Eurozone, while a Board of Directors will be appointed by the Governors to represent: 
“people of high competence in economic and financial matters” from each member state. They will 
be responsible for specific tasks delegated by the Board of Governors. Only the Governors are thus 
democratically elected by the member state publics, while the Directors are technocrats. They all 
have legal immunity, decreasing the level of accountability. A depoliticized structure is thereby 
seen in the entire ESM institution. Votes will still be weighted in proportion to the countries’ 
shares of capital in the ESM (ESM Treaty 2012). 
                                                 
5 Loan facility to EU member states, administered by the Commission 
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A depolitization is also present in the ESM adjustment programs following the loans, as they are 
managed by the Troika, consisting of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. After a country 
requests a loan, the Troika analyses the sustainability of the debt of the country, thereby assessing 
the risk of the financial stability of the euro area. If a macroeconomic adjustment program is 
considered able to restore the sustainability of a debt, the Troika assesses the needs of the 
country, and based on this, the ESM Board of Governors can mandate the Troika to negotiate the 
adjustment program of the country. Granting and terms of conditions is then decided by the Board 
of Governors. After the loan has been transferred, the Troika also has the task of monitoring 
continued compliance to the adjustment program (ESM Treaty 2012). 
From this, the ECB and the other Troika institutions have no decision power, however, the ones 
that do have this power, let it rest upon the Troika’s analyses, assessments and design proposals, 
giving them a significant technical power. The role of the ECB within the Troika is still unclear 
compared to the IMF and the Commission. However, the powers of all these institutions have 
increased from the establishment of the ESM, due to their tasks of designing and the ESM’s 
dependence on the technical expertise of these institutions. 
The EFSF Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of the ESM is Klaus Regling. He is 
appointed by the Governors, and has the power to organise the ESM staff (ESM Treaty 2012). 
Regling is German, and has previous placements in the IMF, the German Ministry of Finance and 
the European Commission of Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, where he helped develop 
the EMU (Klaus Regling CV). From this, Regling somehow represents the personification of the 
Troika and the monetary prioritising entities involved with the Eurozone. He also represents 
Germany’s further power in this technocracy.  
 
According to the ECB, the ESM has a specific mandate and purpose, which is to  
 
“(…) provide temporary financial support to euro area countries, with the aim 
of providing bridge funding for the period of time needed to implement a deep 
adjustment programme to correct imbalances and regain market access”  
(ECB July 2011)  
 
This follows a logic from neoliberalism, where expansive fiscal policy is ineffective and the 
economy should be restored through the market. While the ESM is a permanent mechanism, the 
loans are not meant to become permanent. The idea behind the ESM finances is thus to buy the 
distressed country some time, to get control over its finances, and that ‘control’ is considered 
gained through adjustment programs and austerity measures. More specific guidelines hereof are 
lacking from the ESM Treaty, but they are to be designed by the Troika and approved by the ESM 
Board of Governors. This gives the IMF, the ECB and the Commission an accumulated rather big 
authority towards carrying out this task.  
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An example of a final and specific adjustment program is found in the Greek EFSF program from 
2011. In this, privatisation, wage cuts for public officials and tax increases, including removal of tax 
exemptions, are some of the specific targets. Reforms in public service provision are also on going, 
where healthcare and pensions are deregulated and reformed (European Commission 2011). 
Here, a rather clear Disciplinary Neoliberal idea is seen to be proposed by the Troika and 
supported by Greece through the EFSF. The same strategy is clearly meant to be chosen in the 
ESM. As such, the Troika institutions work by guiding the ESM according to its beliefs in 
neoliberalism, thereby reinforcing its hegemony.    
 
Interest rates 
According to the ECB, the interest rates of ESM financial assistance should be high, that is “a 
minimum that is higher than the historical average rate charged by markets under ‘normal 
conditions’”. The reasons for this are multiple, one being to avoid the loan taking to have a 
passivizing effect on the requesting country. Another reason for the high interest rate is to cover 
the risk taken by the other member states putting up money for the loan, while a third reason is to 
make the assistance unattractive, thereby minimising the risks of moral hazard (ECB July 2011). 
Following this, not only do the requesting countries have to live up to tight austerity measures to 
get these loans, they also have to pay a high interest rate, making the loans rather expensive. This 
issue complies with Overbeek’s view on debt mentioned in the section of historical framework. 
According to him, debt levels as such are not too big a problem, as long as the interest rates on 
them are low. However, when these ESM loans have so high interest rates, the means to create 
stability and calm markets can actually have an effect that makes the countries in distress even 
more distressed, because their debts are made bigger and more expensive to pay back.  
 
4.3 Fiscal Policies 
In this part of the analysis, the initiatives will be analysed in accordance to the chronology of their 
establishment.   
4.3.1 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
As the member states in the EMU were to retain their fiscal policy sovereignty, the EMU could not 
demand a certain way of conducting fiscal policies. However, the aim of the stability oriented 
monetary policy could not work without a complementing fiscal policy, while also the 
consequences of a crisis to the solvency of a country would have consequences for the complete 
Eurozone, and was also likely to create a political compromise towards the no bail-out-clause 
(Issing 2008: 194).  
Therefore, when constituting the EMU certain fiscal limitations on the member states were 
deemed necessary. In the Maastricht Treaty it was declared that: “Member states shall avoid 
excessive government deficits.” As mentioned earlier, the ‘excessiveness’ was defined by two 
reference values: 60% debt and 3% deficit of GDP (De Grauwe 2009: 225).  
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To define the concrete steps in case of deviation, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was 
introduced in 1997. The SGP contained a preventive and a corrective arm (SGP 1997).   
 
The preventive arm was an early warning system, with the goal of preventing excessive budget 
deficits in the member states. The main features were stability programmes, which member states 
had to submit to, showing how they intended to safeguard sound fiscal positions. These should 
create budgetary positions close to balance, and have a certain adjustment path towards a 
medium term objective ensuring this. These programs were assessed by the Commission, while 
the Council examined these assessments and gave its opinion on whether the member states’ 
budgetary programmes had the margins to avoid excessive deficits. In case of deviation from the 
adjustment path and risk of excessive deficit, the Commission could address an early warning to 
member states. Following this warning, the Council should examine the situation and give 
recommendations on the necessary policy measure to get back on track (SGP 1997). As such, the 
SGP transferred part of the fiscal control to the EU-level, and while the Council made the final 
decisions, the technocratic Commission was given a say.  
 
The corrective arm, also known as the Excessive Debt Procedure, was to step into power, when 
the preventive arm did not produce enough result. Moreover, it defined when a budget deficit in 
excess of 3% was considered exceptional (cases of economic downturn, natural disasters, etc.) The 
final decision of whether a deficit was considered to be excessive was taken by the Council after 
recommendation from the Commission. Then, recommendations to correct the deficit were given 
with a timeframe of four months. If these were not followed another two months was given. If the 
deficit was still not corrected, sanctions would be imposed within two months. The sanction 
involved that the member state would have to make an economic deposit based on how big the 
deficit was. If it was not corrected within two years after the deposit was given, it turned into a 
fine (SGP 1997).   
 
From the beginning, the ECB was a strong promoter of rules constraining the fiscal policies. At the 
ceremony of the establishment of the ECB, the President at the time; Willem Duisenberg stressed 
the importance of sound fiscal policies for ensuring price stability: 
 
“Otherwise, price stability can only be maintained at a high cost in terms of 
lost income and employment. That is why I attach great importance to the 
Pact for Stability and Growth” 
(Duisenberg 1998) 
 
The restriction on fiscal policies within the SGP follows the monetarist line from the Maastricht 
Treaty and leaves only little room for e.g. a Keynesian fiscal policy. According to former member of 
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the ECB’s Executive Board, Otmar Issing, a Keynesian approach, where fiscal policy is used to 
create stability, is not possible as it is too slow and as “the political process stands in the way of 
such discretionary fiscal policy action” (Issing 2008: 193). The elections and thus changing politics 
restrict the time horizon for fiscal policy action and make it hard to keep sight of long-term sound 
fiscal policies. “The consequence is a tendency towards rising budget deficits and increasing public 
debt...” (Issing 2008: 193). This can create tensions in relation to a stability-oriented monetary 
policy. According to Issing, the political benefit from deficit spending in a single currency market is 
the one of gaining votes in a single member country, while the consequence, in form of rising 
interest rates (as a consequence of government borrowing), hits all member states.  
Issing’s approach can be explained by New Constitutionalism, where popular democratic forces 
are considered irresponsible, due to their immediate focus on re-election, and where monetarist 
strategies to economic growth are preferred. Thus, in the EMU, rules like the SGP were deemed 
necessary to create fiscal discipline and constrict governments from moral hazards. However, 
there is very little evidence to support that moral hazard should increase in monetary unions in 
general (De Grauwe 2009: 245). Nevertheless, when the member states accepted the SGP, they 
consented to this neoliberal idea, which also followed the line of New Constitutionalism, where 
the governments were left with only little flexibility when forming budgetary policies.    
 
4.3.1.1 The development of fiscal policies in the EMU 
Despite the ambitions of the SGP, the rules of it have appeared to be very hard to enforce. The 
bigger countries have repeatedly presumed limits on deficit and debts. To counter this, the 
weapons of the weak peripheral countries have been to hide their public debt, as in the example 
of Greece and Goldman Sachs (Overbeek 2012). Already in 2003, the corrective arm was eroded as 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) was suspended under pressure from Germany and France. 
The SGP lacked national ownership, while it was easy for the countries to circumvent the 
procedures. As such, the consent given when signing the pact eroded, while it was demonstrated 
that the SGP did not have the institutional capabilities to coerce the member states back into the 
fiscal framework. The response was a reform agreed upon in 2005, which had the countries form 
their own Medium Term Objectives for fiscal balances (Buti & Carnot 2012). This was done under 
protests from the ECB, who was critical to the watering down of the institutional framework. In a 
press release, the ECB’s Governing Council wrote:  
 
“The Governing Council of the ECB is seriously concerned about the proposed 
changes to the Stability and Growth Pact. It must be avoided that changes in 
the corrective arm undermine confidence in the fiscal framework of the 
European Union and the sustainability of public finances in the euro area 
Member States”  
(ECB Press Release Mar. 21st 2005)  
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Since then, the ECB has been promoting that: “Speaking in terms of letters, the “E” and not the 
“M” in EMU is giving cause for concern” (Trichet 2011). 
The ECB had to wait until the end of 2011 to have it their way. As the financial crisis hit Europe, 
the attitude towards public spending changed. This left a momentum for strengthening the SGP 
again. With Germany as the agent of reinforcement, the SGP has been complemented by two new 
sets of rules: The Six-pack and the Fiscal Compact.  
 
4.3.2 The Six-pack 
The Six-pack entered into force in December 2011. It contains four regulations and one directive 
which together reinforce the SGP. It represents the most comprehensive fiscal policy legislation 
since the Maastricht Treaty. The regulations strengthen both the preventive and the corrective 
arm in the SGP.   
Under the preventive arm, budgets are to be closer monitored, while the time period for 
correcting deviations is shortened. It is defined quantitatively what a ‘significant deviation’ from 
the Medium Term Objective is, in order to enable stricter application. Member states are required 
to keep public spending below the GDP rate, unless they compensate with tax increases, while 
they are also expected to use their surplus from tax revenues from growth periods to reduce their 
debt (EP and EC Regulation 2011: No 1173/2011). In this way, the rules on fiscal policies have been 
re-established and even tightened, giving less leeway to democratic institutions and bigger 
influence to monetarist policies and the market forces. As the original SGP, the Six-pack aims at 
constraining fiscal policies, thus it reinstates a New Constitutionalist paradigm, giving the member 
states less influence on their own policies, moving power away from democratically responsive 
forces. 
      
Meanwhile, the corrective arm of the SGP is reinforced through faster application of the EDP. 
Economic sanctions can now be implemented at an earlier stage, and the Commission can call for 
economic punishment against persistent offenders, while fines will be imposed in case of 
continued non-compliance. As something new, the payment of the fines will be transferred to the 
ESM. Of certain importance is the introduction of Reversed Qualified Majority Voting, meaning 
that recommendations and sanctions by the Commission are automatically adopted, unless the 
Council votes against it by a qualified majority (EP and EC Regulation 2011: No 1174/2011). As 
such, the Commission does not have to wait for the recommendations to have been voted in 
favour of, which gives it a big authority in the matter. This setup is rather controversial, as the 
Commission is one of the least democratic entities in the EU system, representing technocrats. 
The Reversed Qualified Majority Voting also means that it gets more difficult for member states to 
shelve their cases, which was earlier one of the main obstacles for reinforcement. The procedure 
introduces a higher degree of automation, believed to make the SGP a more credible tool for 
ensuring fiscal stability. 
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While not removing decision making from public scrutiny, the reversing of the voting still speaks in 
favour of New Constitutionalism, as the technocratic recommendations and sanctions do not have 
to go through democratic processes to be accepted, while the difficult democratic process instead 
regards whether it should be removed. By the member states consenting to the method of the 
Reversed Qualified Majority Voting, a more coercive power is introduced for the Commission to 
act as an institution for a Disciplinary Neoliberal hegemony. This follows after the last decade, 
where the SGP did not ensure the expected consent to the neoliberal fiscal policies it contained, 
while also lacking coercive powers to force these through. This development resembles how the 
current historical context of the financial crisis is different from the previous context of seemingly 
continued economic prosperity, turning decisions that were previously considered unpopular into 
being accepted and thus consented to as necessary. Moreover, the EDP is extended to not only 
regard deficits, but to also be used to tackle member states that might lose control of their 
sovereign debt (EC Regulation 2011: No 1177/2011).  
  
Moreover, a new directive sets minimum standards for the budgetary planning, and requires of 
member states to provide financial data, like forecasts and debt targets and independent 
monitoring, to ensure greater budgetary transparency and better implementation towards the 
SGP. Advice can be provided by the Commission, while member states rejecting these will have to 
explain themselves in public (EC Directive 2011: No 2011/85/EU).  
 
The Six-Pack also introduces an Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), extending the control to 
macroeconomic policy. The EIP uses a scoreboard of different economic indicators to identify risk 
of imbalance to the member states.  In case of suspicion of risk, the Commission will make an in-
depth review, possibly together with the ECB, which will be made public. Based on this, 
recommendations are given to the Council to deal with the problem. Member states identified 
within the EIP need to present a corrective action plan to the Council. In case of lacking action 
from member states, fines can be imposed in the same way as under the EDP. Likewise, the 
recommendations from the Commission are adopted, unless a qualified majority of member 
states vote against it (EP and EC Regulation 2011: No 1176/2011). Thus, the Six-Pack expand the 
New Constitutionalist powers to include macroeconomic policies, giving the Commission and the 
ECB the power to decide whether they see a risk, again giving the Commission the power to 
sanction member states, while the decision has to go through a voting to be reversed. This could 
be interpreted as a New Constitutionalist development, presenting a new leeway for neoliberal 
hegemony.  
4.3.2.1 The ECB 
As the Six-pack is made based on a realisation that monetary policy cannot stand alone in ensuring 
stability within the EMU, it is thought of as an addition to the function that the ECB has. While the 
ECB is not directly involved in the sanctioning of member states, it is taking part in the fiscal 
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policies that the Six-pack represents through its technical expertise and experience. Also, the 
power of the Disciplinary Neoliberalism discourse, heavily represented by the ECB, has made the 
ECB become an institution considered worth and necessary to listen to, and taken into 
consideration when imposing new ideas towards solving the crisis. From the strengthening of the 
neoliberal hegemony, the domain of the ECB is becoming central, spreading in this case to the 
fiscal policies, which are actually outside the mandate of the ECB.   
 
Summarising, the Six-pack is not only reinstating the New Constitutionalist powers representing 
more broadly the Disciplinary Neoliberal hegemony, it is also expanding them, by changing the 
voting system and expanding the area of control. As such, the fiscal constraints are more 
extensive, thereby also extending the influential power of the ECB. 
 
4.3.3 The Fiscal Compact 
To strengthen the new rules in the SGP, the Fiscal Compact has been introduced as part of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). It constitutes an intergovernmental 
agreement, and will enter into force on the 1st of January 2013. The Fiscal Compact requires 
transposition of the SGP into national legislation, where it is meant to have a binding force and 
permanent character, while the European Court of Justice may impose financial sanctions if this is 
not done properly (TSCG 2011: Art. 3.2). By this, future governments will find it much more 
difficult to reverse the constraints on fiscal policy, thereby fulfilling one of the primary objectives 
of New Constitutionalism.  
The member states are encouraged to sign the Fiscal Compact, among other ways through the 
ESM, as it is mentioned in the ESM Treaty as a condition for receiving a loan from the fund (ESM 
Treaty 2012).   
The Fiscal Compact requires parties to respect a Medium Term Objective, which is defined by a 
maximum structural deficit of 0,5% of GDP, unless the country has a debt-to-GDP ratio, which is 
significantly below 60%, whereas the structural deficit is allowed to be 1% of GDP. This is called 
the ‘balanced budget rule’ and must include a correction mechanism, which is automatically 
triggered in case of deviation. The Commission has been given the task of proposing such a 
mechanism (TSCG 2011: Art. 3,1). Moreover, member states with debt exceeding the 60% of GDP 
shall reduce it at an average rate of 5% per year of the exceeded percentage points (TSCG 2011: 
Art. 4).  
Another element is a strengthening of the EDP, establishing further automaticity in case of a 
breach on the deficit criterion, and requiring countries under the EDP to submit budgetary and 
economic partnership programmes (TSCG 2011: Art. 5).   
 
Standardising and automatizing these measures once again removes the ability of governments to 
shelve the cases. According to Mario Draghi (Dec. 15th 2011): “The fiscal compact is a fundamental 
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restatement of the rules to which national budgetary policies ought to be subject so as to gain 
credibility beyond doubt,” stressing the importance of credibility in the EMU. Despite the 
acknowledgement of the Fiscal Compact’s fiscal rule reinforcement, and the level of specification 
presented above, the ECB is still critical to the initiative, and believes the commitments to be 
lacking specificity, while they ask for instruments enabling the EMU to instruct specific reforms 
upon the member states, in case they endanger the smooth functioning of the EMU (ECB July 
2012). From this, the ECB would have liked to see an even more severe centralisation of power, 
strengthening the EMU towards having even more prevailing fiscal power over the nation states, 
thus calling for further New Constitutionalism. 
 
4.4. Outright Monetary Transaction 
As outlined in the historical framework, the interest rates of the Eurozone member states were 
kept low and somewhat similar during the first years of the fully implemented EMU, due to its 
stabilising effect on the Eurozone (finance) markets. However, after the initiation of the crisis and 
its continued severity, mistrust and lack of credibility has taken over and ruined the stabilising 
effects, impacting the interest rates, and making them very different among the member states. 
Countries like Greece and Portugal faced charges of 4-8% higher than countries like Germany and 
Holland in 2010 (Overbeek 2012). Also, Draghi claims some short-term rates to be higher than 
long-term rates, indicating a crisis in confidence (Spiegel.de, Oct. 29th, 2012). Markets demand 
these high rates, because they assess and expect (more or less well-founded) these countries to 
have difficulties in restoring their high debts. Markets thereby insulate themselves against possible 
losses, while some also speculate in these defaults, making money on insurances from defaults, 
and increasing the interest rates even more (Overbeek 2012).  
It is against this backdrop of a lacking credibility in the financial systems that the ECB claims to 
have made the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT), which is the bond-buying scheme that 
Draghi introduced shortly after claiming, the infamous: “(...) the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro (...)” (Draghi, July 26th, 2012). With this, the ECB can buy government 
bonds in an attempt to decreasing their risk exposure and thus lower the interest rates on them.    
 
4.4.1 Safeguarding the monetary policy transmission 
The OMT’s purpose of “safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
singleness of the monetary policy” refers to the exact division of interest rates levels among 
member states, stemming from very different levels of credibility, between countries in the 
Eurozone despite having the same monetary policy (ECB Press Release, Sep. 6th 2012). Draghi sees 
an example of this in the access to finance being determined not by creditworthiness but by 
location (Draghi, Oct. 24th, 2012). As mentioned in the historical framework, this division also 
stems from the structure of the EMU, which has favoured the economy of some countries over 
others.  
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According to Draghi, the current problem facing the ECB, is the so-called ‘monetary policy 
transmission’, which is “the way that changes in a central bank’s main interest rate are passed via 
the financial system to the real economy” (Draghi Oct. 24th, 2012). This has stopped working due 
to the crisis and the external shock it has posed to the financial and banking sector. The fact that 
the ECB lowered the interest rate to a historic low, and that this has not had a particular effect on 
markets, is an example hereof (Spiegel.de, October 29th, 2012). Instead, the real economy is 
hurting from falling economic growth, higher unemployment rates and reduced investment. From 
these arguments, Draghi calls for changing the tools available and for developing new ones in 
order to solve the problems. 
 
Spiegel: “But the fact is you are doing things that would have previously been 
inconceivable.”  
Draghi: “We are also currently in a crisis that was previously inconceivable.”   
(Spiegel.de, Aug. 29th 2012 
 
The idea of a better transmission of monetary policy as a solution to the crisis can be seen to 
follow from Disciplinary Neoliberalism, where monetarist strategies are considered the way to 
ensure growth, employment etc. 
 
4.4.2 Stretching the mandate 
The ECB presented the technical features of this specific so-called ‘non-standard measure’, 
referring to its very recent establishment, in a press release on September 6th 2012. From this 
outline, the OMT mechanism is made to aim at the secondary markets of sovereign bonds. This 
means that the interventions take place on markets where bonds are being traded like and among 
stocks, options and futures. It also means that they are not purchased on the primary markets. 
This is an important feature, when referring to the bond buying mandate of the ECB;  
 
“We are prohibited from buying bonds directly from governments, and we 
abide by this prohibition. But we are allowed to purchase bonds on what is 
known as the secondary market (…) if it is necessary for our monetary policy. 
And that’s exactly what we are doing”  
 (Spiegel.de Oct. 29th, 2012).  
 
Referring to the original mandate of the ECB presented in the historical framework, this can be 
severely stretched, and as long as the actions conducted are made in the name of price stability, it 
seems to be getting support. The fact that the decision about establishing the OMT was taken 
solely by the ECB’s Governing Council adds to the insecurity surrounding the design of this loosely 
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specified framework. Developing its own tool, the ECB acts as a rather independent institution, 
not only in terms of political independence from other political entities, but also in terms of its 
ability to behave according to its own beliefs. Despite possibly bordering this mandate, the ECB 
has been supported by EMU leaders, which also tells something about the current confidence in 
the ECB institution.  
 
4.4.3 Draghi vs. Weidmann 
Jens Weidmann represents a contra representative towards this assumption. He finds the 
confidence in the ECB to be risky. What he and others (especially German’s) fear is that the OMT 
will have a negative impact on the inflation level, when the ECB uses it to buy ‘unlimited amounts’ 
of bonds, and when the ECB press release states that “No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the 
size of Outright Monetary Transactions” (ECB Press Release Sep. 6th 2012). Weidmann fears that 
using monetary policy as such a comprehensive political problem solver as this one, its main 
objective of price stability will recede into the background. He refers to the Bundesbank’s success 
of focusing on price stability, and claims that focusing on other areas than price stability are posing 
a risk towards a repetition the 1970’s era of stagflation. While Weidmann reckons that higher 
inflation rates are not currently found in the Eurozone, he still finds the OMT to be risky 
(Spiegel.de Aug. 29th, 2012). From this, it is obvious that Weidmann fears that the OMT is a move 
towards the Anglo-French version of central banks, where other objectives are just as important as 
price stability, and where the governments have influence on central bank policies.  
It has been argued different places, that it might be a good idea for ECB to make a move in such a 
direction and act as ‘lender of last resort’. Some have discussed whether the OMT will become 
similar to ‘quantitative easing’, a method used by inter alia the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England, where liquidity is injected into the market to enable economic stimulus (blogs.WSJ.com 
Sep. 6th 2012). However, from a monetarist point of view, this supersedes the main objective of 
price stability, risking both inflation and the independence of the central bank.   
Draghi’s response to this is that the ECB promises that the liquidity ensured by the OMTs “will be 
fully sterilized”, meaning that “for every euro we inject, we will withdraw a euro”, so that the total 
amount of euros in the market stays the same (ECB Press Release, Sep. 6th; Spiegel.de Oct. 29th, 
2012). As such, the money supply is not supposed to increase, as it is in ‘quantitative easing’, 
where the central bank prints new money for the injection and inflation thus is not affected. 
Draghi also argues that the scheme is to be for the current situation of crisis only, where the 
markets and their usual mechanisms are out of function (Spiegel.de Oct. 29th, 2012). 
 
Moreover, Draghi claims his focus to be exactly on price stability, but sees the way to ensure this 
to be a task for exactly the OMT. As he explained, when he went to the Deutscher Bundestag in 
October trying to calm the German Members of Parliament;  
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“In our assessment, the greater risk to price stability is currently falling prices 
in some euro area countries. In this sense, OMTs are not in contradiction to 
our mandate: in fact, they are essential for ensuring we can continue to 
achieve it”                 (Draghi, Oct. 24th, 2012)  
 
Weidmann avoided commenting on whether he thinks the ECB is overstepping its mandate 
through the OMT, which might again refer to the much unspecified mandate, making it difficult to 
put a legal finger on it. However, he is not reluctant towards criticising the OMT for being 
undemocratic and risking the tax payers’ money. This is due to the fact that bonds purchase of 
sovereign countries by the ECB will end up in the balance sheet of the entire Eurosystem, where 
the risk will be collectivised on all citizens of the Eurozone. As this controversial decision is made 
by the ECB, and not by the governments, it is democratically challenging (Spiegel.de Aug. 29th, 
2012). Weidmann can hereby be said to criticise the depolitization of the EU integration becoming 
a task for the ECB, as presented by Aaron Major to be an expression of neoliberalism.   
4.4.4 Not just a new Securities Market Programme 
The OMT is, however, not the first bond buying scheme introduced by the ECB. Former ECB-
President Jean Claude Trichet introduced a Securities Market Program (SMP) in 2010, to which the 
OMT has many similarities. In much the same way, the SMP was opposed by the Germans, and the 
German member of the Executive Board, Jürgen Stark, resigned in protest against it, claiming the 
ECB was doing monetary financing. As a reason of this, the SMP was hobbled. The OMT has been 
designed to avoid ending in the same problems; it comes with fiscal conditions, it is unlimited in 
scope, and it is supplemented with a policy narrative explaining why a central bank should buy 
sovereign debt, when its mandate is price stability (ft.com Oct. 31st 2012).       
4.4.5 Lack of accountability 
The ECB Governing Council is in charge of decisions about start, continuation and termination of 
OMTs, and will base these decisions on compliance to conditions, which are adhering to the ones 
of the EFSF and ESM, as well as on whether the requesting countries keep fulfilling these 
objectives (ECB Press Release Sep. 6th 2012).  
The fact that decisions on this are made by the Governing Council of a bank, representing the 
Presidents of the national central banks makes it rather unaccountable. While the ECB refers to 
weekly publications of holdings and market values and monthly publications of average durations 
of OMTs on a country basis when justifying its level of transparency (ECB Press Release, Sep. 6th, 
2012), actual decision making power still rests within the technocratic executive entity of the ECB. 
Moreover, the ECB does not publish minutes or votes from its meetings, which otherwise would 
create transparency about which basis decision is made upon. This structure makes the OMTs 
resemble the New Constitutional development, as is generally detected in the current EU 
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integration development. Representing a new tool makes it not only reinstate the development 
but taking it a step further.      
 
The OMTs are used only on condition of adhering to an EFSF or ESM adjustment program, outlined 
in analysis 4.2. Also, the IMF is taken on board in the design and monitoring of an OMT purchase, 
resembling the role of the IMF as part of the Troika in the EFSF/ESM programs (ECB Press Release, 
Sep. 6th 2012).  
This exact link is being criticised by Weidmann, who foresees that the OMT will resemble a linking 
of monetary and fiscal policy, as the ECB will be provided with a power to set the interest rates of 
sovereign bonds (Spiegel.de, Aug. 29th, 2012).  
Weidmann finds the fiscal reforms, where the member state governments decide over the scope 
and structure of the cuts, to be the right way to solve the crisis, and he finds the interest rates best 
reduced through decisive implementation of agreements and promises, where Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy are seen as good examples. Here Weidmann clearly supports the austerity 
measures imposed from the EFSF and ESM loans, where monetary policy imposed by the ECB is 
not involved (Spiegel.de Aug. 29th, 2012).   
4.4.6 Summary 
Besides the technical features of the initiatives, clearly outlined in their presentation, their impact 
on the role of the ECB has been found to also have ideational weight.      
Similar for all of the initiatives is that they have strong monetary features, stemming from 
Disciplinary Neoliberal and New Constitutional beliefs. As the ECB is the institution representing 
these in the EMU, the utility of the ECB has increased with these initiatives.  
Besides providing itself with a new tool for stabilising the markets through interest rates, the OMT 
has changed the role of the ECB in terms of resembling its strengthened independence. The OMT 
rather clearly lies outside the borders of clear monetary policy, especially due to the fiscal 
conditionalities attached, whereby it resembles the furthest stretch of the ECB mandate of price 
stability. This shows how the ECB can somewhat do what it wants, as long as it justifies in a 
convincing way its actions through price stability and independence.  
 
4.5 Forces 
Based on the findings from the analyses of the initiatives above, this last section of the analysis 
places the initiatives in a broader context, determined by what type of force they represent. From 
this, the analysis is an attempt to outline how the forces, individually and/or in context with each 
other and within the historical context, can be found to explain the changes of the ECB.   
While the forces affect and overlap each other, it is acknowledged that such a division might seem 
artificial. As such, it is meant to be an attempt to distinguishing between the multiple forces, and 
grasp their effects on the development of the role of the ECB, thereby answering the third 
research question.      
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4.5.1 Force of ideas  
Cox presents the idea that problem-solving theory has the best conditions in times of stability, 
while Critical Theory tends to prevail in times of crisis, as this is also when alternatives and 
movements appear that can challenge and change the prevailing structure (Cox 1983). Due to the 
current context of a severe financial crisis, the conditions for alternatives should be somewhat 
favoured.  
The prevailing force of ideas identified in the analyses above is that of Disciplinary Neoliberalism, 
as presented by Gill as the neoliberal and financial, as opposed to social market and social 
democratic, model of capitalism (Gill 1998). Placed within a continued transnational historical bloc 
of capitalism, the hegemonic status of neoliberalism as the prevailing discourse is thus still found 
to be in power, whereby it has survived the crisis. From this, the idea of monetarism has also 
suppressed its opponent; the Neo-Keynesianism.  
4.5.1.1 Fiscal ideas  
The conclusion about a currently prevailing idea to be one of Disciplinary Neoliberalism is justified 
by applying the initiatives onto Cox’s concept of ‘force of ideas’. As demonstrated earlier, the EMU 
has a general design of Disciplinary Neoliberalism, with the ECB performing the monetarism, while 
the SGP constricted the fiscal policies.  
However, after a short period, it was clear that the fiscal idea was not adhered to. Even though the 
ECB was addressing this, it never became an issue, before the financial crisis was linked to this 
wasted past. This period of realising a failure in the economic institutional setup should give way 
for alternative collective images to challenge the idea of the SGP, as claimed by Cox. However, 
new ideas challenging the monetarist foundation of the EMU did not get the upper hand. Instead 
the narrative of fiscal gluttony as reason to the crisis gained advantage. According to American 
economist Paul Krugman, there is a fiscalization of the economic discourse in Europe: 
 
“Listen to many European leaders — especially, but by no means only, the 
Germans — and you’d think that their continent’s troubles are a simple 
morality tale of debt and punishment: Governments borrowed too much, now 
they’re paying the price, and fiscal austerity is the only answer.”  
(Krugman, Sep. 11th, 2011) 
 
Despite the fact that this tale only covers a little part of what went wrong (and for some member 
states none is covered), it has been a strong collective image within the EMU. As a result of this, 
the SGP has been reinforced and extended through the Six-pack and the Fiscal Compact. As 
shown, this setup and reinstatement of rules is in line with the Disciplinary Neoliberalism, as this 
favours a rules based constitution to ensure tight monetary discipline. The rules of these two 
initiatives include fiscal austerity in case of deviation, which is similar to the ideas behind the 
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adjustment programs within the EFSF/ESM loans, which also set the conditions of the OMT, and 
these thereby fall in line with the Disciplinary Neoliberalism as well.   
 
4.5.1.2 So what’s the alternative? 
Considering monetarism to be a feature of the prevailing order of Disciplinary Neoliberalism, this 
could also be seen as a ‘collective image’ that alternative images can disagree with. These kinds of 
alternative ideas are seen on different levels. At the highest level is the opposition to Disciplinary 
Neoliberalism itself. Here is a belief in solving the crisis not through austerity measures, rules and 
sanctions, but through investments. From this, the neoliberal hegemony within the capitalist 
historical bloc is challenged. A more Keynesian idea of economic growth, requiring temporary 
deficits, represents what Gill considers to be the social market and social democratic model of 
capitalism. However, such a strategy of investment has been limited by the SGP and the Six-Pack, 
while the countries receiving loans from the ESM/EFSF have to comply with even stricter austerity 
measures. As such the further development of New Constitutionalism subverts the possibility for 
Keynesianism.    
This demonstrates how strongly Disciplinary Neoliberalism has safeguarded the hegemony. 
Outside Europe, investment-based solutions to the crisis are present. Even a country like the US, 
which is popularly regarded to be more liberal than most of the member states in the EMU, is 
using stimulus packages as a crisis solving tool. The debate in the US have also had a big focus on 
budget deficits rather than on creating jobs, but this have been nothing compared to the EMU, 
where investment focused collective image has lost grounds to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in spite 
of its crisis (Krugman Sep. 11th 2011).    
4.5.1.3 The unbreakable euro 
At a lower level, a collective image is found in the idea of staying within the euro. This is found to 
be a force permeating the initiatives.   
Based on the fact that several member states have physically applied for the EFSF/ESM loans and 
for the ECB to buy their government bonds, despite the expensive conditions, these countries 
adhere to the idea of monetarism and are staying within the Eurozone. However, whether the 
member states had other options, being part of the Eurozone, and thus in a financial situation not 
providing them with many choices, might be unlikely.  
Leaving the Eurozone has been legally difficult, as a clause was lacking in the Maastricht Treaty, 
outlining the procedures for how to leave the euro. An option to opt out was introduced with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, where leaving the entire EU, not just the EMU, was made explicitly possible 
(Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Art. 50). The effects hereof are difficult to fully grasp.  
What is easier to grasp is the fact that the country leaving would return to its former national 
currency, whereby the country can either go bankrupt or devaluate, and get rid of its debt. 
However, this will hurt the rest of the Eurozone, through mistrust, worthless pay backs, lack of 
competition etc. It would also have consequences for the Eurozone tax-payers as e.g. the Greek 
central bank owed €100 billion to the other central banks as of 14th May, which would then be 
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lost. Likewise private banks all over the Eurozone would face problems as they also hold bonds 
from distressed countries (The Economist May 9th, 2012).  
  
From this basic outlining, sound alternatives for the member states in distress seem to be 
lacking, due to the ideas behind the structural setup of the EMU. However, the other member 
states might also have their reasons the distressed countries within the union.  
At a lower and more practical level, the membership of the EMU also deprives the member 
states some important tools otherwise helpful. As mentioned in the analysis of the EFSF/ESM, 
even the IMF, famous for its beliefs in adjustment programs, has started hesitating towards the 
level of austerity and the limited time for implementation, due to lacking results hereof 
(Financial Times Oct. 11th, 2012). This is controversial, as it indicates a potential cracking up of 
the neoliberal hegemony represented by the Troika, and by IMF itself.  
4.5.1.4 Do not inflate, please 
The focus on low inflation can be considered the idea and main collective image of the EMU, 
resembling a belief among the power holders that have been ‘disciplined’ by the market forces. As 
such, price stability and monetarism, with an independent central bank, are clear features, 
constituting the Disciplinary Neoliberal hegemony of the Eurozone. As this is the number one 
mandate of the ECB, this institution again falls in the centre of this idea. From the initiatives and 
the policies surrounding them, it seems that the ECB can stretch this mandate to great lengths, as 
long as it refers to this particular idea and does not take orders from member states.  
 
A cornerstone in the Disciplinary Neoliberal idea within the EMU seems to be that the price 
stability is important, because it creates competitiveness. The reforms are made to ensure 
credibility and markets will get confidence in the euro so as to make it able to compete with other 
currencies. If this is done, all other good things will follow. However, much of the time 
competitiveness seems to be a goal in itself, while the welfare and employment of the populations 
comes in second. As such, the focus is the image of the euro outwards and not inwards. 
This collective image of the importance of competitiveness has been opposed by people feeling 
the real economic consequences of the monetarist austerity strategy. The social effects on 
people’s lives have been very severe already, as seen in for instance Greece, where financial 
distress has led to a rise in the far right movements, blaming immigrants for the financial 
problems. In other groupings, the austerity strategy as the solution to the crisis is being opposed 
with images relating Angela Merkel and the ECB to Nazism (washingtonpost.com, Oct. 2nd, 2012). 
This extreme development might be a consequence of the hegemony, resembled in the 
adjustment programs, not being flexible, and thereby unable to avoid such a development. As 
such, while the governments of the debt-stricken countries might be giving their consent to the 
austerity measures in the need for loans, the people they are representing might not be giving 
their consent to it.  
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4.5.2 Force of institutions  
As seen above there is a clear link between the Disciplinary Neoliberalism, which from the 
beginning has been a big part of the EMU, and a strong central bank. While Disciplinary 
Neoliberalism is mainly found within ideational forces, the concept of New Constitutionalism is 
seen as the institutional force that transfers power to central banks and other technocratic 
institutions, based on the idea of Disciplinary Neoliberalism.  
The ECB is at the very centre of a New Constitutional development. As such, the ECB has from the 
beginning been an important actor in sustaining the hegemony, due to its authority over price 
stability.  
In the historical context of the financial crisis, the ECB has turned out to be even more important 
and has taken a decisive role. As seen through the analysis, the ECB has been given new 
responsibilities through the initiatives extending beyond the monetary field, thus stretching its 
original mandate. In this process, the ECB becomes an important institution for enforcing and 
sustaining the Disciplinary Neoliberal ideas.  
The adjustment programs linked to the EFSF/ESM demonstrate clearly how neoliberal austerity is 
enforced through the ECB as an institution. The programs and the power found in the hands of the 
Troika in designing them, makes it possible to frame the Troika institution as being used to clobber 
the weaker. As the ECB participates in designing the adjustment programs, although its role 
compared to the IMF and the Commission is not fully clear, gives the ECB a better opportunity to 
ensure that its ideas of price stability and of strategies towards ensuring that is taken on board. 
This gives the hegemony of Disciplinary Neoliberalism an advantage, as this can be maintained 
through the power of the ECB as an institution. 
This use of the Troika to clobber the weaker into the neoliberal track can resemble somewhat of a 
force of consented coercion. By this is meant that member states in financial distress find 
themselves with no other (attractive) options than to take on a loan from an institution, and 
accept strict austerity, which they then have to adhere to. It thus indicates some sort of consent, 
when the member states continue requesting these loans. However, looking at the high price of 
these loans, in terms of strict austerity measures as well as high interest rates, also indicates that 
the requesting countries are desperate and out of alternative options, as presented in Force of 
Ideas. As seen in the EFSF/ESM analysis, these tough conditions and high prices are part of the 
ECB’s idea behind the loans and adjustment programs, as an attempt of making them unattractive.  
Due to the Eurozone and its institutional setup, member states can be seen as forced to take these 
loans, thus not consenting towards the idea of monetary strategies, but rather finding themselves 
coerced to do so, thereby being pushed by the force of consented coercion.  
 
4.5.2.1 OMG it’s the OMT   
As the OMT is bound to the conditionality of the ESM, it can be said to contain the same element 
of consented coercion from the member state. However, with the OMT, the ECB decides both the 
amount and when to start and stop the buying of bonds, as long as the country is under an ESM-
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program, including the preventive kind. By that, the ECB has given itself a potential power over 
fiscal policy, along with new controls over the market.  
It is not a new thing that the ECB practices this kind of influence of linking the obtaining of 
distressed government’s bonds with demands towards strict fiscal policy. In August 2011, Draghi 
and the former ECB President, Trichet, sent a (at that point secret, but later infamous) letter, 
spelling out measures that Italy needed to adapt to, in order to restore investors’ confidence in 
the Italian bonds market. The letter provides a list of recommended austerity measures, like wage 
repressions, pension cuts, full liberalisation of public services, legal clauses of future public deficits 
etc. (Corriere.it Aug. 5th, 2011). Despite Trichet’s attempt to water down the severity of the letter, 
by referring to the normality of the ECB sending recommendations to the governments, the tone 
underlining the need for the Italian government to follow the ‘recommendations’ indicates that 
ECB bond buying of Italian bonds could be risked. Considering the context of the letter referred to 
as an ECB Governing Council meeting on the Italian bond market only makes this indication 
stronger. Also, as the Italian President, Silvio Berlusconi, started complying with these 
recommendations, the ECB started to buy bonds to bring down Italy’s borrowing cost (Financial 
Times, Sep. 29th, 2011). As such, the OMT is not to be considered as a completely new measure, 
now it has just become institutionalised and explicit.  
 
The ability for the ECB to develop the OMT scheme demonstrates how easily the mandate of the 
ECB is stretched into now enabling the ECB to intervene in matters otherwise meant for markets 
to handle. The reason for this can be found in the very loose definition of the mandate in the 
Maastricht Treaty. As demonstrated during the analysis, the ECB has been able to move beyond 
monetary policies and also circumvent the no-bail-out-clause, and it seems like this has been 
possible as long as the ECB does so in the name of price stability, and while claiming to stay 
independent.  
This development of the ECB as an institution is evident, when comparing to the original tools 
available for the ECB, when price stability was ensured through interest rate setting and control of 
the amount of euros in the market, outlined previously. After a first widening of power, through 
the influence of designing adjustment programs and monitoring adherence to them as a Troika 
member, the ECB has developed the OMT tool itself. This increased scope of power indicates that 
the ECB as an institution is moving towards taking ‘a life of its own’ (Cox 1983).  
This development is reflected in the clash with Bundesbank President, Jens Weidmann regarding 
the OMT. While Draghi and Weidmann agreed on the objectives of the ECB - ensuring price 
stability - they did not agree on how to ensure that. However, Draghi made the proposal go 
through without the support of the Bundesbank, but with the official support of Merkel (Wall 
Street Journal, Sep. 17th, 2012). 
As the powers of the OMT is not given to the ECB by others, and as the powers reach beyond what 
would normally be expected of a central bank within Disciplinary Neoliberalism, this development 
of the ECB seems to somehow be a mutation of both New Constitutionalism and the German 
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central bank model. While the ECB is staying independent and safeguarding price stability, it is 
doing so, partly by imposing financial policy and indirectly monetising debt.   
This development and its legitimacy can be seen as a way of ensuring the continued neoliberal 
hegemony by changing the form of it, through re-regulation, now putting power into the hands of 
technocracies like the ECB. As such, this could be regarded in a Gramscian way as if the hegemony 
is being flexible, to ensure its dominance in this time of crisis.  
 
4.5.2.2 Politicised but independent and unaccountable 
However, it is not only the market that the ECB can correct with the OMT. During the crisis, the 
ECB has been ready to provide financial support, but only when getting fiscal concessions in 
return.  
Through the OMT, and as part of the Troika, the ECB’s ability to shape the economic policy of 
weaker states has been extended. By attaching the bond-buying to conditionalities, demanding 
certain fiscal policies in return for the bond-buying, the ECB could be interpreted as becoming 
politicised, while remaining independent of the member states. As such, the ECB has become one 
of the most important institutions to enforce the idea of Disciplinary Neoliberalism. For the 
member state governments, it might feel convenient, as they do not need to be the ones imposing 
the austerity measures.  
However, in both the ECB in general and in the ESM and OMT there seems to be only a little 
transparency and accountability. Taking legal features into consideration, it will require change in 
the Maastricht Treaty to revisit the mandate of the ECB, outlining again the strong mandate of 
independence.  
The lack of a clear role division within the Troika presents an important and interesting point in 
itself. By merely looking at each institution within the Troika, they are technocratic and far away 
from democratic elections and public scrutiny. Not being able to see who is responsible for what in 
the Troika only adds to this insecurity. These features implicate that the monetary system is 
suffering from an accountability issue.   
According to the ECB, the ESM is well overseen by each member state through the Board of 
Governors, while the European Parliament is regularly reported to (ECB July 2011). However, no 
Member of Parliament is found in any decision making seats, which would increase the level of 
public and democratic representation. Also, the ECB refers to scrutiny through audit reports, 
annual reports and quarterly summaries, which constitute a rather weak level of examination as 
audits, as well as reports on profit and loss etc. are basic procedures for disbursing institutions. 
The fact that the ECB claims these procedures to be enough to ensure accountability and scrutiny 
is somewhat weak.  
This strong independence and weak demands for accountability, strengthened through the 
initiatives, resemble a European integration development that is becoming even more 
undemocratic. The ECB is not on public election, it represents central bank leaders, and is 
accountable to provide audits and reporting to the European Parliament only once in a while, as 
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outlined previously. Thus, when the ECB is considered one of the main players in the era of crisis 
solving, and when this is such an undemocratic institution, the Eurozone is turning into suffering 
from a severe democratic deficit.  
 
4.5.2.3 The bigger leeway for monetarist field 
In general, the initiatives have opened up for more monetarist policies and thus a more important 
ECB. This is very apparent in the new fiscal policies. Thus, while only involving the ECB to a lesser 
extent, the Six-pack and the Fiscal Compact give a bigger leeway to the ECB as an institution. By 
restricting the fiscal policies, more emphasis is given to monetarist policies, and as such the ECB 
has become the main institution for ensuring stability in the future.  
With the SGP, this was the intention from the start, but it was not consented to by the member 
states earlier on. However, with the fiscalization discourse during the crisis, the idea that fiscal 
policy needs to be restricted seems to have regained its footing, and by introducing stricter rules, 
more automation and more powers within the Commission, the coercive power is strengthened.  
However, the way that the Fiscal Compact is pushed through, as international law bypassing the 
treaties in the EU, could be seen to demonstrate the EMU leaders’ fear of lacking consent towards 
the Compact and thereby a need for using coercive force. Changing the treaties would require 
referendums in some countries, as it would be a constitutional change. Nobody knows whether 
the populations of the EMU would give their consent, but forming the Fiscal Compact as 
international law, allows the EU not to be dependable on whether the populations give their 
consent to it (Oberndorfer Mar. 8th 2012). Also, constitutionalising the rules make them harder to 
break and can clearly be seen as a New Constitutionalist development, where the depolitization 
becomes harder to roll back. As such, the fact that the rules become legally binding indicates less 
need for consent for the neoliberal hegemony to work. Thereby it is certainly in the interest of 
ECB.  
 
4.5.3 Force of material capabilities 
In this analysis, the forces of material capabilities are unlike those of natural resources. Instead, 
technical and organisational capabilities, and the wealth to finance them, are relevant to this 
analysis.  
 
In its origin, the ECB was fitted with organisational capabilities in the forms of having decision 
power over the common monetary policy of the Eurozone, thereby the interest rate level and the 
amount of euros in the markets. Also, it had technical capabilities of being governed by a council 
of central bankers having knowledge on banking and monetarist systems and policies, as well as it 
had financial capabilities through the EMU (Maastricht Treaty 1992).  
Through the SGP, the ECB as an institution has been acting as somewhat of an EMU police officer. 
It has continually made public recommendations to the member states on how to achieve their 
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medium-term objectives. By observing, monitoring and delivering public warnings to respect the 
SGP, the ECB has also been outing offenders. It has been argued that the ECB has had the chance 
to act as a judge, as it can punish offenders by raising interest rates (Howarth et. al. 2004). Despite 
the infamous letter to Italy, the influential weight behind these recommendations is difficult to 
estimate, as is the actual power of acting as a judge.   
 
In the context of the financial crisis, the ECB has had several capability advantages. Considering 
how the crisis quickly developed from being a banking and into a sovereign debt crisis, making the 
national central banks financially distressed, the crisis triggered a need for ECB involvement. Also, 
being a technocracy, and not on public election, enabled the ECB to react quickly and without 
hesitation, as it was not on re-election. As such, the ECB has had an effective set of capability 
forces, from which it could react swiftly on the crisis.   
 
The mantra and single most precious objective of the EMU is monetary policy and price stability. 
During the crisis, the EMU has been ready to go new length to ensure this. As the ECB’s mandate is 
to be the protector of this, its institutional placement has given it a heavy influence. The objectives 
of the crisis solutions have moved into the turf of the ECB, requiring its expertise and supporting 
its values. From this, the mere idea that the ECB represents has been given more focus, whereby 
its capabilities have become considered more useful than before, regardless of the new 
capabilities it has also gained.  
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Recalling the mutual trinity introduced in the research design, the ECB was placed as the 
conductor of monetary stability:  
 
However, the arena for the ECB to use its forces of capabilities has changed during the crisis, when 
it has become a part of the Troika. This provided a potential influence in matters of fiscal stability 
in distressed member states. Here, its technical knowledge from being a central bank became an 
enormous advantage for the institution, as the ESM Board of Governors bases its final decisions on 
analysis and assessments made by the ECB and the other Troika institutions, thus potentially 
affecting the adjustment programs conditioning ESM and OMT loans. The mere ‘sitting at the 
table’ in the Troika provides the ECB with this arena for influence, and the fact that the ECB is 
taking part in several of the stages of the design, implementation and monitoring only enhances 
this force.   
 
Relating to the financial stability, it is important to note the material capabilities, which have not 
been transferred to the ECB, because they have been taken over by the EFSF/ESM. As the funding 
in the crisis mechanisms is coming from the governments, it violates the ‘no bail-out clause’ in the 
Maastricht Treaty, prohibiting intergovernmental transfers, but meanwhile it safeguards the ‘no 
bail-out clause‘ of monetising debt. This is important to ECB’s objective of price stability. 
 
The EFSF/ESM somewhat safeguards the ECB from acting as a ‘lender of last resort’. This would 
otherwise be a move towards the less independent Anglo-French central bank model, where the 
ECB would be able to buy the government bonds that the private sector did not wish to hold. This 
has been resisted by both the ECB, and especially the Bundesbank, who fears that it will lead to 
inflation, and refers to the ECB’s mandate and independence, which would be overridden. The 
EFSF/ESM gives the ECB an excuse not to become the EMU ‘lender of last resort’ (Collignon 2011). 
From this, the ECB safeguards its mandate of protecting price stability in line with Disciplinary 
Neoliberalism. As such, the EFSF/ESM is giving the ECB an influence on the fiscal policy and the 
possibility to impose strict programs, while not having to implement the dirty work and jeopardise 
its own role.  
However, this safeguard could be questioned by the OMT, where the ECB can indirectly monetise 
debt. However, the ECB seems eager to frame that the OMT will not be used as a way of becoming 
lender of last resort, but only to fix the market. This might be due to the ECB fearing that the 
markets will lose confidence in its eagerness to fight inflation. In such a case, it is very useful for 
the ECB to have the ESM to refer countries to, when countries go cap in the hand. As such, the ECB 
has gotten a tool that can affect the financial stability, while safeguarding its role as the protector 
of monetary stability.  
The interpretations of what the OMT will imply have been many. However, as it has not yet been 
used, it is difficult to know precisely how it will work. Nevertheless, the OMT is found to be a 
manifestation of a new tool and thus technical capability of the ECB, giving it a new potential to 
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act out its ideas. With the OMT follows new ways of making member states comply with the force 
of ideas, thereby ensuring conditionality of the requesting member states. The fact that the OMT 
is to be used only by the ECB strengthens the scope of this capability.  
 
As demonstrated throughout the analysis, monetary policy is chosen as the preferred strategy to 
create general stability. As such, the field where the ECB is originally supposed to work within the 
limits of is growing, compared to the fiscal and financial fields. With the stricter rules and bigger 
enforcement potential in the new fiscal pacts, the ECB’s role as policeman and its mandate to 
ensure price stability is made somewhat easier. This is due to the institutionalisation and 
automation of the rules making them into institutional capabilities, whereby the ECB can now 
simply refer to them. Together with the ECB’s original and intended political independence, and its 
avoidance of making final unpopular decisions about adjustment programs, this might relieve the 
ECB from in the future having to conflict directly with the member states.  
  
4.5.4 Summary 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the superior collective image in the EMU is still the one of 
monetarism. Despite the fact that the crisis has opened up for interpretations that question the 
idea behind the basis of the EMU, the dominant idea has become that the original Disciplinary 
Neoliberal version was not properly finished, and this needs to be done now. This leads to a 
further increase of New Constitutionalism, where the ECB is an essential institution. With the 
implementation of the OMT, the ECB has even developed a tool, which goes beyond what was 
originally understood as New Constitutionalism, thus stretching the ECB’s mandate and 
capabilities. As such, the ECB has been equipped and has equipped itself with tools reaching 
beyond monetary policy. 
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5. Conclusion 
The ECB’s role has changed during the crisis. That assumption seems to be possible to state with a 
fair amount of confidence after looking through the original role and mandate of the ECB, 
compared to how the crisis solving initiatives have impacted this role. This is not because a new 
hegemony is taking over the power, but because the Disciplinary Neoliberal hegemony is 
developing and adapting to the current context, thus being flexible in the way Gramsci claims it 
can be.  
Elaborating on this change, Cox can be useful, when claiming Critical Theory, and thus alternative 
structural orders, to have the best conditions during times of instability. However, the analyses of 
the initiatives have shown that their features towards solving the current crisis are of 
neoliberalism, thereby staying within the thought patterns of the same hegemony that was 
suddenly in a context of crisis. The initiatives indicate a tendency, where rather than questioning 
the foundation that the EMU was built on, the crisis has become a momentum for the hegemony 
to finish the implementation of the EMU, which was started, but never properly finished.  
 
As such, the changed role of the ECB can be understood in a context of a Disciplinary Neoliberal 
hegemony, where it is progressively becoming more important as a result of the crisis. An 
explanation for this can be found in the lack of consent to the hegemony as it is no longer ensured 
by the context of seemingly continued economic prosperity. Instead, the initiatives call for the 
institutional force of New Constitutionalism, where the ideas of the Disciplinary Neoliberal 
hegemony are implemented through a depolitization of monetary and fiscal policy powers. As the 
ECB represents an essential institution in this equation, the crisis has seemingly given momentum 
for the ECB to expand its role. 
In this context, coercion has been found to have taken over some strategies of the EMU financial 
system. In Gramsci’s understanding, this would imply that the hegemony of Disciplinary 
Neoliberalism is fragile, because it lacks the consent from the civil society to be legitimised and 
maintained. However, using the mutation of Gramsci’s concepts into one of Consented Coercion, 
found to dominate the current situation, the hegemonic adaption to the historical framework for 
action might indicate that the hegemony is actually being maintained. As this is not done entirely 
through coercion, as in Russia in Gramsci’s time, the hegemony might last for a long time to come.  
 
While the ECB is utmost central to the EMU, it did not attract much attention during the times of 
prosperity. However, with the current crisis, its institutional capabilities have become an 
important weapon for the hegemony to stay in power. Moreover, the ECB has taken the 
responsibility to tell some governments, how to run their debt stricken countries, thus becoming 
politicised. However, it remains independent, and does not have to be accountable to the people 
in these countries.  
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Draghi resists that the euro is irreversible, and as highlighted in the beginning of the report “(...) 
the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro (...)”. Whether the ECB will have the 
power to safeguard the euro is probably a question, which will be hanging in the air for some time. 
However, when a journalist at a press conference asked: 
 
“Mr Draghi, you repeated that the euro is irreversible. What gives you the 
democratic legitimation, the authority to say that? Because I have looked it up 
in the Treaty. It does not say anywhere that it is the role of the ECB to decide 
what kind of currency the European countries have. Thank you.“ 
 
Draghi weaved for some time without giving any real answers and ended at:   
 
“So unfounded fears of reversibility are just what they are: unfounded fears. 
And we think this falls squarely within our mandate.”  
(ECB Press Conference, Sep. 6th, 2012)
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6. Epilogue  
During the work on this report, multiple events related to the focus of this work have happened. 
While necessary to keep a clear focus, these have been held out of the report. However, they are 
so important that they deserve to be mentioned 
6.1 Consequences for the real economy 
From an analysis of the changed role of the ECB during the time of financial crisis and the reasons 
behind this, a need is found to take a step back an reflect on what effects this have on the real 
economy and the people of the Eurozone. This is not to state that the strategy chosen is all wrong, 
but the effects hereof are seen to be severe on both a societal and on a human level, making it 
worth mentioning.   
 
When the financial system froze and the financial crisis hit, thousands of people around the 
Eurozone lost their savings and eventually their jobs. As the initiatives imposed by the EMU 
institutions involved cutting back wages and pensions, increasing tax levels and privatising social 
services etc., the people with no job, and those who lost their pension savings, were among the 
biggest losers.  
  
The effects of unemployment can be difficult to set a price on in general. When adding to it that 
many of these people also lost their pension savings, and that cuts have been made in social 
services, their situation can be financially devastating. A social effect like distress is seen all over 
the Eurozone, most far-reaching in Greece’s radicalising group; the Golden Dawn (Daily Mail, May 
4th 2012), and in the non-radical but wholehearted, huge and first ever general strike in the 
Southern European countries, which took place in November 2012 (Guardian.co.uk Nov. 14th 
2012).   
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Especially youth unemployment (Eurostat: people between 15 and 24) is seen to be severe, where 
Spain for instance currently faces a rate of over 50%. Talks of ‘the lost generation’ are flourishing. 
The danger of this and radicalism is dangerous to ignore – even after receiving a Nobel Peace 
Prize. These examples show that a lot people within Europe explicitly do not consent to the EMU 
system and its way of handling the current situation.   
 
6.2 Towards a banking union 
The appointment of tasks and powers to ECB does not stop with the initiatives analysed in this 
report. On the 13th of December, the Council agreed on a Single Supervisory Mechanism led by 
ECB (EC Press Release Dec. 13th 2012). As the final decision on the SSM is this recent, it has not 
been possible to process it in our analysis. However, as we see it as a further development of the 
perspectives addressed in this report, this part of the epilogue will shortly highlight the main 
features of it.  
The SSM gives the ECB supervisory powers over the 180 largest banks in the EMU holding 90% of 
the assets in the Eurozone. The banks need to follow one of three criteria to become part of the 
SSM:  their assets are bigger than 30 billion euros or make up at least 20% of their home country's 
GDP; they have already received indirect help from the Eurozone rescue fund; or they have 
significant cross-border operations (Wall Street Journal Dec. 14th 2012, Spiegel.de Dec. 13th 2012).   
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The intention of the SSM is to avoid systemic banking crises in the future. Originally, it was 
intended for 6000 banks, but Germany succeeded in restricting it. Because of this, the further 
integration of the EMU has been framed as driven by Germany, following a popular understanding 
of Angela Merkel as somewhat of a personification of a hegemon in the EMU (Financial Times Dec. 
14th 2012).  
Europe’s central bankers were the ones who introduced the idea, as they started calling for bank 
governance in the EMU back in March (Financial Times, June 18th 2012). Less than one year after, 
this idea has been secured foothold with substantial powers being transferred to ECB. 
 
The SSM gives the ECB full investigative powers in the banks. If the banks get out of line, it will be 
able to penalise them with fines and ultimately take away banking licenses. The ECB will also be 
able to intervene in the practices of the banks, telling them to e.g. boost their capital buffers or 
restrict risky lending. If the ECB believes there is a need, they will also be able to intervene in the 
smaller banks (Wall Street Journal Dec. 14th 2012 and Spiegel.de Dec. 13th 2012).  
The SSM will be attached to the ESM, which will be able to provide aid directly to banks, to avoid 
history to be repeated and let a banking crisis develop into a sovereign debt crisis. However, it will 
only give loans and not be able to recapitalise banks as was also suggested. (Spiegel.de Dec. 13th 
2012).  
The need for a supranational supervisory organ stems out of the cross border consequence that 
bankruptcies might have, and follows a rationale of national authorities having difficulties 
diagnosing the problems as they might be too closely related to the banks. Especially in time of 
crisis, it is believed that national politicians find it hard to take the necessary steps (Financial 
Times, June 18th 2012). As the new supervisor, the ECB will have the power to overrule these 
governments. Thus, the SSM could be seen as a depolitization transferring the supervision to ECB. 
However, with the new task, the ECB once again moves out of the monetary field. This time it 
conquers the field of financial stability. Normally, Germany insists that monetary policy is 
separated from financial supervision, but they retreated from this to become able to negotiate its 
other preferences (Wall Street Journal Dec. 14th 2012). As such, the SSM might highlight how the 
hegemony is adjusting to the current context and how the New Constitutionalism is mutating, 
with the ECB at its centre.   
 
The SSM is an important move towards a banking union within the EMU. However, it is also part of 
much further reaching plan; “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, put forward by 
the President of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy, in close collaboration with the most important 
technocrats in EMU, among these Mario Draghi. This plan proposes changes up to 2017 and 
involves among other things: changes in the treaties which allow the Commission to intervene in 
national budgets and demand them changed. The plan is to end up with a fiscal union including a 
European Minister of Finance with unbounded authority over a big part of the national fiscal 
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policies. The question about how much of it will be adopted is for the future to answer. 
Nevertheless, it highlights how the crisis has given the momentum for a technocratic driven 
integration of the EMU. 
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